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I estimate the relative magnitudes of worker switching costs and how much the employer switching
of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. Institutional features imply that voluntary
turnover dominates switching in the market for Swedish engineers from 1970--1990. I use data on
the allocation of engineers across a large fraction of Swedish private sector firms to estimate the relative
importance of employer wage policies and switching costs in a dynamic programming, discrete choice
model of voluntary employer choice. The differentiated firms are modeled in employer characteristic
space and each firm has its own age-wage profile. I find that a majority of engineers have moderately
high switching costs and that a minority of experienced workers are responsive to outside wage offers.








Moderately low levels of voluntary worker turnover between employers often characterize labor markets for
skilled workers, such as the market for Swedish engineers studied in this paper. This empirical fact opens the
possibility that enough high-skilled workers do not switch employers in response to outside wage offers in a
way that would lead to voluntary reallocation of workers across ﬁrms and sectors in response to the varying
product market successes of ﬁrms. Indeed, in a survey of blue-collar workers in New Haven, Connecticut, in
the late 1940’s, Reynolds (1951) ﬁnds that 12% of workers would move to a new geographic area for a change
in permanent wages of under 25%, 30% of workers would move for a permanent change in wages of between
25% and 100%, and 45% would not move to a new area under any circumstances.
In my model, workers face switching costs when they move between ﬁrms. Each employer offers a unique
wage policy that I estimate. Using this framework, I empirically examine the causes of voluntary employer
turnover to see if switching costs are large, and if so, how switching costs vary for switching across geographic
regions, industries, and corporate boundaries. I also estimate whether turnover is responsive enough to outside
offers to lead to small differences in wages causing voluntary reallocation of experienced workers across ﬁrms.
This paper examines the labor market for Swedish engineers from 1970–1990. As Section 3 discusses,
Swedish institutional features, such as wage compression and restrictions on ﬁring, make it more plausible
to model the observed, across-ﬁrm employment allocation as the revealed preferences of engineers given the
location decisions and wage choices of employers. Employment allocations in Sweden therefore ease the
estimation of workers’ underlying preferences for voluntary employer switching.
The econometric procedure estimates the importance of four categories of employer characteristics in the
underlying utility function that governs each worker’s decision to stay at his current employer or switch to a
new one. The four employer characteristics are wages, switching costs, nonwage beneﬁts and taste shocks.
Nonwage beneﬁts are proxied for by ﬁrm size. I also estimate heterogeneity in worker preferences by spec-
ifying three discrete worker types, each with separate preferences for employer characteristics and separate
population frequencies. After estimating worker preferences, I calculate each worker type’s switching rates
under alternative labor market structure scenarios and the switching response to one ﬁrm’s unilateral wage
increase. The latter output is analogous to a labor supply elasticity. Estimating worker preferences may also
inform us about the behavior of experienced, white collar workers in less unionized labor markets, to the degree
that underlying preferences are similar across countries.
Across-ﬁrm variation in wages is necessary to precisely estimate the importance of outside offers in the
decision of whether or not to switch employers. In the data on Swedish engineers, across-ﬁrm variation is best
captured by differences in percentage raises received by stayers at a particular ﬁrm, rather than variation in the
level of wages. In reduced-form empirical work, I show that the rate of wage increases is negatively correlated
with separation at the ﬁrm level. The level of wage is not highly correlated with turnover, which suggests
that this measure captures mostly unobserved heterogeneity in worker ability or preferences or unobserved
heterogeneity in workplace environments. By contrast, a percentage raises speciﬁcation is consistent with
symmetric (to the worker and ﬁrms) unfolding of new information about a worker’s idiosyncratic ability. This
paper abstracts from theories of personnel policies by saying that each ﬁrm offers its own stochastic process for
age–wage proﬁles. In a ﬁrst stage, I estimate ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁve-year percentage wage increases using the data
advantage of observing multiple stayers for each ﬁrm. I must also model how a worker’s wage changes when
he switches between the compensation policies of his old and new ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that a younger worker’s wage
upon a switch is more closely linked to the average wage of similar workers at the new ﬁrm than is an older
worker’s wage.
1This paper models employer choice as a dynamic programming, discrete choice. Given his current wage,
age and employer, a worker knows his individual-speciﬁc stochastic processes of future age–wage proﬁles at
his current and potential employers. The worker has symmetric information about his possible future wage and
taste shock outcomes at all ﬁrms, and can choose to work at any Swedish employer of engineers. He picks
the employer that maximizes the expected discounted sum of his future utility. The worker considers how his
decision in the current period will affect his decision of whether to switch in the future. For example, a worker
who moves to an employer in a large city knows that many other potential employers are close by, and his
probability of switching in the future will increase. Likewise, the worker weights the stochastic process for
age–wage proﬁles at his current period’s choice by the probability that he will remain there in the future. The
worker moving to the ﬁrm in the large city may not place much emphasis on the stochastic process of wages at
his destination far into the future because he feels it is unlikely that he will remain at that ﬁrm for a long time.
Estimation chooses the relative importance of the four types of employer characteristics in the current period
utility function (switching costs, wages, nonwage beneﬁts and taste shocks) that make the observed employer
choices the most likely of all outcomes within the parametric structure of the model.
The employer switching model is based upon the Rust (1987) framework for single-agent, discrete choice
dynamic programming problems. Each period, the dependent variable is the employer chosen by a worker. The
strategy of estimating elasticities of labor supply to individual ﬁrms using a single-agent, dynamic program-
ming switching model is similar to methods used in the estimation of the elasticities of demand for consumer
products with ﬂuctuating prices and that are storable, durable or that have aspects of intertemporal substi-
tutibility in the preferences for consumption (Erdem, Imai and Keane, 2003; Hartmann, 2006; Hendel and
Nevo, 2006). The model is also similar to the simultaneously-developed model of geographic movement in the
labor market of Kennan and Walker (2009). This paper is the ﬁrst time a single-agent dynamic programming
model has been used to estimate the elasticity of labor supply to individual ﬁrms. It is also one of the few papers
to use techniques from even myopic discrete choice demand estimation to estimate labor supply behavior, as
most researchers do not have data on the distinct compensation schemes of all ﬁrms in a labor market.
Theestimatesoftheunderlyingpreferencesofworkershavemeaningforeconomicquantitieswhenworkers
are placed in particular labor market scenarios. As an example, consider a stylized labor market with 400
employers, eachindifferentindustries, eachseparatedby100km, andeachofferingthesamestochasticprocess
for age–wage proﬁles. My estimates predict that 15% of age 35–39 engineers will switch over a ﬁve-year
period. When evaluated at the ﬁrm characteristics in the data, I ﬁnd that a typical ﬁrm that unilaterally increases
its raises by 1% for each ﬁve-year age range will reduce the ﬁve-year switching probability of age 35–39
engineers by -0.52% from a predicted base of 15%.
These causally-interpreted results of course depend on the precise modeling assumptions. As the ﬁrst paper
attempting to directly model employer switching as a function of the age–wage proﬁles of many competing
ﬁrms, some strong assumptions have been made that could be relaxed in future work. However, there are some
more descriptive empirical results that are less sensitive to the modeling assumptions. First is the ﬁnding that if
the wage of an employer switcher is apportioned to the old and new ﬁrms, the share apportioned to the old ﬁrm
increases with worker age. Second is the (not directly reported) ﬁnding that turnover patterns are not highly
correlated with mean wage levels at a ﬁrm. Third is the ﬁnding of an economically large negative correlation
between ﬁrm turnover rates and the rate of wage increases at a ﬁrm. See Figure 4 for the latter result. These
results complement the results in Figure 1 of Fox (2009b) using the Swedish data, which shows how age–wage
proﬁles vary by ﬁrm size.
22 Identiﬁcation Overview
Let me provide a brief overview of how I identify the preferences of workers. In a ﬁrst stage, I estimate the
age–wage proﬁles of ﬁrms by using the data advantage of observing many workers per ﬁrm. I use these proﬁles
to predict the wage of all workers at all employers. These predictions are worker-speciﬁc: the worker’s state
variables (his previous employer, his age and his previous wage) all enter into the prediction of wages.
In a second stage, I use a discrete choice model to, in a very loose sense, regress a worker’s decision of what
ﬁrm to work at on the worker’s differences in the predicted age–wage proﬁles at all ﬁrms and the differences
between the characteristics of a worker’s previous employer and his potential new employers. The sensitivity
of employer choice to differences in predicted wages identiﬁes the sensitivity of worker utilities to wages
and the sensitivity of employer choice to changes in characteristics between the previous and new employers
identiﬁes switching costs. At its simplest, the model is just a multinomial choice model of employer choice.
A key distinction from a standard discrete choice analysis is that the worker’s state variables are right side
explanatory variables, so in a sense the discrete choice model uses data on period t deviations from the period
t  1 employment outcomes.
The actual model is a dynamic program. Workers consider not just the predicted wage in the current period,
but the expected, present discounted value of wages for the future.
I use panel data, as I see the same worker make employment decisions over several time periods. Re-
peated observations on the same individual allow me to identify heterogeneity in preferences for wages and
heterogeneity in worker switching costs.
Just as demand estimation seeks to explain product choices with prices and other product characteristics,
labor supply estimation seeks to explain employer choices with wages and other employer characteristics.
Despite the above complexities, at its simplest level identiﬁcation just compares turnover rates and employer
destinations to the age–wage proﬁles of ﬁrms. Figure 4 is a ﬁgure that shows the correlation between wage
proﬁles and turnover rates, across ﬁrms. Firms with steeper age–wage proﬁles have lower levels of turnover.
The details behind Figure 4 will be explained soon.
Thisidentiﬁcationstrategyrequiresstrongassumptions. First, Idonotuseinstrumentstocorrectforomitted
variable bias in wages. Age–wage proﬁles may be correlated ﬁrm-level unobservables that also enter into
worker utility; I rule this out by assumption due in part to the lack of convincing instruments in the data.
Second, I do not correct the ﬁrst-stage estimates of age–wage proﬁles for selection bias: the observed age–
wage proﬁles at a ﬁrm are assumed to be reﬂective of the wages available to switchers to that ﬁrm, at least
for young workers. One reason I do not explore selection correction is the lack of excluded variables that
affect employer choice but not wages. I will return to the selection correction point at several places in the
paper. Third, workers can pick any employer; ﬁrms do not have to decide to extend offers. All of these are
serious potential concerns, although I believe some of the issues are mitigated in the Swedish labor market for
engineers, as I now discuss. This is a ﬁrst paper in a new area of research; future work could weaken these
assumptions.
3 The Swedish Labor Market for Engineers
Estimating workers’ preferences of where to work and ﬁrms’ preferences for whom to hire and ﬁre is difﬁcult,
as the econometrician does not observe employment matches available to agents on either side of the market.1
1In Fox (2009a), I show how to semiparametrically estimate agent preferences in static two-sided matching models with endogenous
wages, like the assignment models of Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1972). The endogenous wages in these
3This paper uses an empirical model that assumes the observed employment allocation is the result of only
voluntary employer choices by workers. In other words, the model severely limits the role of ﬁrms in labor
markets, which means observed employment matches are the revealed preferences of workers for employer
characteristics such as wages. This assumption allows empirical progress as I can tractably model voluntary
employer choice by workers as the dynamic decision of whether to switch from one stochastic process of wages
to one of several hundred other such processes.2 Keep in mind that the predicted wages for each worker in the
employer choice model will be worker-speciﬁc; it is not the case that the model assumes the wages of one
worker are offered to all workers.
This section argues that the highly unionized nature of the Swedish labor market for engineers makes the
paper’s model of voluntary employer choice a better approximation of reality than in less unionized labor mar-
kets. Legal and union bargaining institutions prevent Swedish ﬁrms from making unconstrained wage setting
and employment decisions. These institutions make viewing a ﬁrm’s hiring and wage policies as the solu-
tions to an unconstrained proﬁt maximization problem difﬁcult. However, the constraints provide an economic
environment where the assumption of voluntary employment choices by workers is more appropriate.
This paper uses data on the wages and employer choices of engineers who work as white collar workers in
the Swedish private sector. The data are collected by the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF in Swedish). I
use engineers who have completed a ﬁve-year undergraduate degree from one of several university equivalents.
Especially during the sample period 1970–1990, these engineers were among the most highly educated workers
in the Swedish private sector. The use of engineers contrasts with studies of worker behavior that focus on all
workers, less-skilled workers, or on unusual workers such as CEOs and professional athletes.
As I have said, the paper’s economic model of employer choice by a worker contains strong limitations on
the role of employers in the labor market. The strongest assumption is that employers do not screen workers
before extending offers: the model assumes that workers can pick from any ﬁrm employing Swedish engineers,
althoughnotnecessarilyatthesamewage. Arelatedassumptionisthatﬁrmsdonotﬁreworkersorinvoluntarily
transfer them between establishments: all turnover is voluntary in the model. Together these assumptions mean
that the observed employment choices, given last period’s state variables, reveals the preferences of workers,
and the data can be used to estimate the structural parameters of workers’ utility functions using a single-agent
empirical model.
The model assumes that individual ﬁrms will, on the margin, hire all prospective engineers who choose
to apply. While this assumption is false, it may be less so in Sweden. The number of Swedish engineers
is constrained by enrollment limitations at the ﬁxed number of government-run technical institutions allowed
to offer ﬁve-year engineering degrees. Also, the socially progressive nature of centralized wage negotiations
in Sweden during the sample period means that the wages of highly-skilled workers such as engineers were
artiﬁcially low in order to reduce wage inequality. A ﬁrm should earn a surplus if it employs a worker at a
lower wage than his marginal product. If we would ever expect to ﬁnd data on a normal labor market where
there is a quantity shortage at the given price, engineers in Sweden is it. One problem with the assumption of
no screening is that while different industries hire the various engineering specialties (mechanical, electrical,
etc.) in differing quantities, the data do not list such specialties. My empirical solution allows switching costs
to vary by the industries of the origin and destination ﬁrms.
The empirical model assumes that all employer switching is voluntary. An outcome of both negotiations
between ﬁrms and unions and the 1974 Law on Employment Security is that layoffs in Sweden happen in the
models are not rich enough to reproduce the complex age-wage proﬁles chosen by the ﬁrms in the Swedish data.
2Equilibrium search models typically make a similar assumption that rules out screening by ﬁrms: for all workers and ﬁrms that come
into contact with each other, the ﬁrm extends a wage offer to the worker (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).
4inverse order of seniority.3 Swedish ﬁrms cannot choose whom to lay off; they must follow a preset rule. This
lack of discretion implies that ﬁrms may be reluctant to lay off workers, except in the direst circumstance. Fir-
ing for cause is also very difﬁcult in Sweden, because ﬁrings must be justiﬁable to a union. Therefore, Sweden
is an excellent place to study voluntary employer switching, as most switches in the data are voluntary. I clean
the data by eliminating establishments that shut down during a particular ﬁve-year time interval. Workers fre-
quently transfer between establishments owned by the same legal company, so the model includes a switching
cost in the current period utility function to ﬁt this aspect of the data. Again, the maintained assumption in the
model is that all transfers between establishments owned by the same company are voluntary.4
During the sample period 1970–1990, ﬁrms and unions collectively bargained over wages for engineers
at the national, industry, and ﬁrm levels. National bargaining for white collar workers ended in 1991, after
the sample period. Engineers belong to the CF union, which is part of the SACO university graduate union
federation, which itself bargained with the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF) at the national level as part
of the PTK white collar workers’ cartel.5 A large fraction of nominal wage increases is due to wage drift,
or ﬁrm level wage increases. Section 7 describes the resulting across-ﬁrm wage heterogeneity. The union
negotiations limit the scope of my investigation to the behavior of workers conditional on the outcomes of the
negotiations. However, the negotiations do mean that age–wage proﬁles observed in the data do not perfectly
adjust to make the total utility from all employer choices equal, after nonwage beneﬁts unobserved in the
data are included. In other words, wage differences across ﬁrms in Sweden probably reﬂect local bargaining
realities and not only compensating differentials for unpleasant work. The literature on discrete choice demand
estimation emphasizes that the potential correlation of prices with unobserved product characteristics is a major
impediment to consistent estimation of consumer preferences (Berry, 1994). If Swedish institutions affect
wages but not employer choices directly, they create wage variation that aids in identifying the preferences
of workers. Furthermore, the formal process behind choosing a stochastic process for age–wage proﬁles at
a ﬁrm implies that the model’s assumption of employees being promoted at different speeds within the same
stochastic process for wages may be more accurate than an alternative assumption of an individual-speciﬁc
market for the labor supply of each worker.
This paper estimates the relative importance of switching costs in employer switching decisions. In the
model, workers have perfect information about expected outcomes at all employers. I therefore view switching
costs as most likely representing psychic costs of disrupting work and living routines, rather than informational
frictions. However, data on switching where workers do not arbitrage away all wage differences can also be
explained by search costs and related statistical matching processes (van der Berg and Ridder, 1998; Postel-
Vinay and Robin, 2002). In fact, the across-ﬁrm wage distribution can be explained as an equilibrium where
the underlying ﬁrms and workers are identical (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998). On the other hand, several
characteristics of the labor market for engineers suggest that pure search costs might not be the most important
friction to base a model around. The employers of engineers (the ﬁrms in the data) are dominated by large man-
ufacturing concerns, many representing ﬁrms well-known both within Sweden and internationally. Engineers
and their union representatives should be familiar to a large degree with the characteristics of these employers,
and at the least could conduct a targeted search for a new position. The reality is probably that both search and
switching costs play a role in decreasing switching.6
3The legal relationship between employer seniority and layoff risk means that switching costs may be higher in Sweden. However,
unemployment for engineers is close to zero over the sample period, so the cost of a layoff is more likely to be a psychic disruption cost,
rather than a large salary decrease.
4For engineers, 21% of all observed moves are to an establishment owned by the same legal company.
5I do not translate Swedish acronyms for labor unions.
6There are still other models that explain the persistence of employment relationships, particularly the decline in turnover with age.
5While I believe most switching costs are psychic disruption costs, institutional features can also affect
switching costs. In Sweden, the government provides or heavily regulates health care and pension plans, and
switching ﬁrms does not reduce these welfare state beneﬁts. On the other hand, capital gains taxes on housing
may interfere with geographic mobility (Lundborg and Skedinger, 1998). Likewise, some Swedes live in rent-
controlled apartments, which the renters cannot use if they switch to employers in different regions. To the
extent that the switching costs reﬂect these institutional features of Sweden, the structural parameters will be
less reﬂective of the preferences of non-Swedish workers.
4 Overview of the Model
This section presents an overview of the model. The full dynamic programming, employer choice model and
corresponding estimation details are presented in Appendix A.
Only 14% of the engineers in the cleaned SAF data used in estimation switch employers during a ﬁve-
year period. One explanation is Swedish workers have high switching costs that lead to employer lock-in for
experienced workers. An alternative explanation is Swedish workers are not locked in, and the Swedish wage
structureisnotdesignedtoattractexperiencedworkerstonewﬁrms. Ineedtoestimateworkers’responsiveness
to wages and switching costs in order to empirically distinguish between these explanations for low switching
rates. This section and Appendix A outline a structural model of voluntary employer switching that allows me
to estimate the preferences of Swedish engineers for employer characteristics, including switching costs and
wages.
Following Rust (1987), there are two key functions in any dynamic programming, discrete choice model:
the current period utility function and the state transition rule. First, there is the current period utility function.
In my model, the current period’s utilityof a worker foremployment at a particularﬁrm is a functionof four sets
of objects: the worker’s predicted wage at the ﬁrm, switching costs, ﬁrm size, and a ﬁrm- and worker-speciﬁc
logit preference shock.7 I estimate parameters that control the importance of wages, ﬁrm size and switching
costs relative to the logit shocks. Importantly, switching costs can vary depending on whether the old and new
employers are in the same industry, whether the old and new employers are in the same corporation, and the
geographic distance between the old and new employers. There is a base switching cost that is realized for all
switches.
Any dynamic programming model has a vector of state variables. Here the state variables are threefold:
the previous employer of the worker, the previous wage of the worker, and the age of the worker, a proxy for
experience and the time remaining to retirement. As the next employer is a choice variable in the model and
because age advances deterministically with time, the only state variable with uncertainty (from the worker in
the model’s viewpoint) in its evolution is the wage of the worker. The wage of the worker at all ﬁrms follows a
set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc age–wage proﬁles. The functional forms behind these ﬁrm-speciﬁc age–wage proﬁles are
For example, job search may give workers a better worker-ﬁrm match as they age. To the extent that wages in the good match are higher
than bad-match outside options, the good match will persist. Older engineers in my sample do not earn large wage decreases upon an
(apparently) voluntary ﬁrm switch, but as this is a selected sample, it is not strong evidence against the model that emphasizes job-worker
matches. To some extent, the switching costs that increase with age in my model can be seen as reﬂecting better psychic match values for
older workers, but my model does not encompass wages that reﬂect the quality of the job-worker match unobservable, in either production
or a worker’s utility. Some previous empirical work has thought about the match between workers and careers. By looking at a relatively
homogeneous worker class (engineers with ﬁve-year degrees) in one national labor market, I hope to make jobs more comparable across
ﬁrms, so the notion of an unobservable match term for each pair of a worker and a ﬁrm is less relevant in explaining the switching variation
in the data.
Note that many search models also lack a match-speciﬁc component in either production or wages (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998;
Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).
7I have also estimated a version of the model where size is not included; the implications for switching behavior are quite similar.
6discussed in the next section, as estimates of the wage proﬁles are explicitly reported in the text.
The complete dynamic programming model predicts employer choices by each worker given the age–wage
proﬁles of each ﬁrm, the parameters in the current period utility function, and the state variable of each worker.
Solving the dynamic program via backwards recursion and then integrating out the preference shocks gives a
choice probability for each pair of an employer and a worker. This choice probability for each ﬁrm is the main
output of the model. Summing choice probabilities across workers gives the labor supply function facing the
ﬁrm.
Again following Rust (1987), estimation proceeds in two stages. First, the age–wage proﬁle of each ﬁrm is
estimated. Second, theﬁrm-speciﬁcage–wageproﬁlesareusedasinputsintoadynamicprogram. Thedynamic
program is used to construct a likelihood function. The likelihood uses panel data (observations on employer
choice for the same worker over time) to identify unobserved heterogeneity in the current utility function:
responsiveness to wages and the level of switching costs vary across workers. Estimation of the parameters in
the current utility function uses the nested ﬁxed-point approach in Rust (1987), where the dynamic program is
solved once for each guess of the parameters in the utility function by an outer, optimization routine.
5 The Functional Forms for Age–Wage Proﬁles
Because I will report estimates of age–wage proﬁles in the main text, I must ﬁrst describe the functional form
choices for the components of age–wage proﬁles.
5.1 States of the Employer Choice Problem
The states of a dynamic programming model are similar to the right hand side variables that distinguish one
worker’s choice problem from another’s. In order for the dynamic program to have economic meaning, I must
deﬁne the components of the vector of these state variables, si;t for worker i of age t, and I must describe the
functional forms for the transition density of the state variables, h(si;t+1 j si;t; ji;t; qw), where ji;t is the employer
chosen by worker i of age t and qw is a vector of wage parameters to be estimated.
The state variables are the age of a worker, t, his previous employer, ji;t 1, and his wage at his previous
employer, wi;tt 1;t 1. The age of a worker captures his outside wage opportunities, his current level of switching
costs, and the remaining career over which he can enjoy any wage gain. In the model, the worker chooses an
employer every ﬁve years, so age, t, corresponds to a ﬁve-year interval.8 The ﬁve-year interval is chosen
to reduce computational time in solving the dynamic program.9 The previous employer, ji;t 1, of a worker
captures his current position in terms of geographic location, corporate membership, and industry afﬁliation.
If he switches ﬁrms, his switching costs are a function of how these ﬁrm characteristics change. Finally, the
lagged wage, wi;tt 1;t 1, captures the heterogeneous positions of workers within their current employers and
in the labor market as a whole. The lagged wage is a sufﬁcient statistic for a worker’s future wage outcomes,
conditional on his path of employer choices into the future.10
In the dynamic programming model, a worker’s discrete age category, t, evolves according to the laws
of time, and, from the worker’s point of view, his lagged employer, ji;t 1, is a discrete choice he has made
and will make into the future. The only non-deterministic portion of the state transition density function
8In the data, an engineer can switch multiple times over a ﬁve-year interval. Failure to account for this will tend to overstate switching
costs. In the data, the number of engineers making multiple switches over a ﬁve-year interval is small.
9As I model worker behavior from 25 to 60, there are 5 periods of a worker’s life where employer choices are modeled.
10This corresponds to a model where a worker and all ﬁrms have symmetric uncertainty about his present and future ability.
7h(si;t+1 j si;t; ji;t; qw) is the portion
f
 
wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

corresponding to the uncertain evolution of wages. I write out the full state vector to emphasize that the
density of future wages is a function of the individual-speciﬁc lagged wage. I estimate the unknown parameters
qw in ﬁrst-stage wage regressions. While the density is identiﬁed, there are not enough engineers working
in the Swedish private sector to estimate f
 
wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

nonparametrically, so I impose
parametric functional forms for f. The parametrization of a transition density is somewhat arbitrary, and below
Ioutlineaparsimoniousspeciﬁcationthataddressesunobservedheterogeneityinworkerabilitywhilecapturing
across-ﬁrm differences in wage policies.





use the means and variances as the parameters for a normal distribution of one period ahead wages, f. For a
known series of future employment decisions by a worker, the combination of age-speciﬁc, one-period-ahead
densities creates a ﬂexible Markov process for both the within- and across-ﬁrm evolution of wages. I call the
stochastic process of wages at a particular ﬁrm its stochastic process for age–wage proﬁles, to emphasize the
long-term implications of employment decisions and wage changes in the current period.
The question of what parametrization to use for f remains. There are countless ways to summarize a
stochastic process for wages. For example, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) decompose the level of
wages into ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, and the effects of observable time-varying
characteristics such as worker experience. Abowd et al. are well aware that they have performed a statistical
decomposition, which does not always correspond to the primitives of an economic model, as shown by, for
example, Woodcock (2003).11 I now discuss the parameterizations of the wage processes for employer stayers
and employer switchers separately.
5.2 Wage Process for Employer Stayers
For a parametrization for the stochastic process of age-wage proﬁles at an employer to be useful as an input
into the employer choice model, it must capture heterogeneity in both worker abilities and in employer wage
policies. In order to capture heterogeneity in worker ability, I estimate log wage regressions where the depen-
dent variable is a percentage wage increase. In a wage increase regression, previous information on a worker’s
ability that has already been incorporated into wages is differenced out.12 From the point of view of an agent
in the employer choice model, ﬁrst differencing relates to a symmetric informational assumption about worker
ability: the ﬁrm incorporates known information into wages, and the worker has no additional private informa-
tion. Farber and Gibbons (1996) present a model of symmetric learning about worker ability (symmetric across
all potential employers and the worker) and derive and validate empirical implications from the model.
In order to capture heterogeneity in ﬁrm compensation policies, I estimate a ﬁrm- and age-speciﬁc ﬁxed
11The conditional independence (i.i.d. errors) assumption of Rust (1987) allows the stochastic processes for wages to be estimated in a
ﬁrst stage. Intuitively, the information agents possess about the future is assumed to be equivalent to the variability in future wages observed
by the econometrician. Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) and Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) estimate the information agents
possess about future outcomes, using behavioral assumptions in addition to statistical decompositions. These methods have been used for
the low-dimensional choice problem of whether to attend college, and would be difﬁcult to generalize to the dynamic employer choice
problem studied here.
12In fact, speciﬁcations where the independent variable is the level (not change) in log wages produces the surprising result that ﬁrms
paying higher wages have about the same or even greater turnover. One explanation for a nonpositive relationship between wages and
retention is that a wage level speciﬁcation does not control for unobserved heterogeneity in worker ability. Firms paying a high wage level
may have better workers, and those better workers may be able to get similarly-paid jobs at other ﬁrms.
8effect in percentage raises. If workers are forward looking, their switching behavior will respond not only to the
level of wages as a ﬁrm, but to whether or not workers can expect to receive a large wage increase in the future.
For white collar workers, Figure 1 in Fox (2009b) suggests that differences in the stochastic processes of wages
in large and small Swedish ﬁrms are best captured by differences in slopes: the levels of percentage wage
increases are higher in larger than in smaller ﬁrms. Young workers would all go to smaller ﬁrms if they choose
ﬁrms myopically. However, the rapid pace of wage increases means that the long-term payoff to working at
large ﬁrms may be higher for forward-looking agents. Fox (2009b) discusses some theoretical explanations
for the set of facts involving age–wage proﬁles and ﬁrm size. The relationship of wage proﬁles to ﬁrm size is
interesting but not critical to the empirical work; what is needed is plausibility exogenous variation in wage
proﬁles across ﬁrms.
For those workers of age t who remain at a ﬁrm j over the period, I estimate gj;t and s2
j;t from the linear
speciﬁcation
wi;j;t  wi;j;t 1 = gj;t +hi;j;t; ift > 30; Var(hi;j;t) = s2
j;t; (1)
where wi;j;t is the observed log wage of worker i of age t at employer ji;t and the gj;t’s and the s2
j;t’s are ﬁrm-
speciﬁc parameters that capture the means and the variances of the percentage raises given to age t workers. In
practice, I let the difference between ages t and t  1 represent a time period of ﬁve years, which speeds up the
dynamic programming problem by reducing the state space.
Conditional on a worker staying for all future periods, the functional form choice for percentage wage
increases creates a random walk with drift stochastic process for wage levels. A random walk with drift has
the important property that shocks to the level of wages are permanent, in expectation.13 Figure 1 shows this
property for three different workers at the same ﬁrm. The solid line in the middle of the graph shows the average
age–wage proﬁle of a career stayer at the ﬁrm. The dashed line above the average proﬁle reﬂects a worker who
receives a higher-than-average ﬁrst period wage increase, while the lower dashed line shows a worker with a
negative ﬁrst period wage shock. Between periods 2 and 3 the random walk with drift assumption means that
all three workers are predicted to have the same percentage increase in their wage, which is reﬂected in the
equal slopes of the second period wage change in Figure 1.
5.3 Wage Process for Employer Switchers
In the employer switching model, a worker predicts how his wage will change when he moves from his current
employer’s stochastic process for age-wage proﬁles to another ﬁrm’s. The Swedish data allow the examination
of the wage increases of employer switchers based upon the identities of the origin and destination employers.
The model’s prediction about a worker’s initial wage offer in a new ﬁrm is the convex combination of a
hypothetical wage in the old ﬁrm and a hypothetical wage in the new ﬁrm. The two hypothetical wages are
calculated using the within-ﬁrm age–wage proﬁles whose estimation I discussed in Section 5.2. I estimate the
weights on the two hypothetical wages by regressing the actual wages received by ﬁrm switchers on the two









i;jt 1;t is the hypothetical log wage at the old ﬁrm, ji;t 1, and w
hypothetical_new
j;t is the hypothetical
13Topel and Ward (1992) present evidence that a random walk with drift approximates the evolution of the wages of workers. However,
Baker (1997) shows that such statistical tests have low power, and that wage processes may have individual-speciﬁc rates of wage increase.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) estimate wages as the sum of a random walk and a transitory component.
9Figure 1: Functional Form for Firm Stayers: Random Walk with Drift
Worker with Low 1st Period Shock
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log wage at the new ﬁrm j. For each age category t and ﬁrm j, I estimate three parameters: the wage weights
zold;t and znew;t, as well as the variance of the error term t2
j;t. I do not include a constant term in the regression,
which makes the weights zold;t and znew;t tend to sum to 1.0, although I do not impose this constraint in
estimation. Because I only observe a few switchers at every ﬁrm and age group, I estimate the equation using






j;t using within-ﬁrm data. My assumption that within-ﬁrm wages are a random walk with drift
means that a decent prediction of the wage of a stayer is
w
hypothetical_old
i;jt 1;t = wi;jt 1;t 1+ ˆ gj;t;
where wi;jt 1;t 1 is the observed previous log wage paid to the employee and ˆ gj;t is the estimated average
percentage raise paid to stayers of age t and ﬁrm j. I estimated ˆ gj;t in (1) above. The wage w
hypothetical_old
i;jt 1;t is
an individual-speciﬁc measure, because it is a function of the observed lagged wage of a worker. I estimate
w
hypothetical_new
j;t using an even simpler method: I calculate the average log-wage (in levels) paid to ﬁrm stayers










where there are Ij;t;stayer observed stayers in age category t at the destination ﬁrm j. Unlike the measure for the
worker’s current ﬁrm, w
hypothetical_new
j;t is not an individual-speciﬁc measure because it takes into account only
the circumstances of workers currently at the potential destination ﬁrm.14
14One criticism of the functional form assumption in (2) is that a worker’s heterogeneous position in the labor market is captured only
by w
hypothetical_old
i;jt 1;t , and not the identity of ﬁrm jt 1 in a more direct way. There is no reason to suspect that the same wage at all other
ﬁrms should be treated the same; for example, a ﬁrm with an unpleasant work environment might pay all workers a high wage, so that
an individual worker’s high wage at that ﬁrm would not be a symbol of labor market success. In principle, the nonparametric density
formulation for the Markov process of wages, f
 
wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

, allows for a worker’s wage to be interpreted in light of
the identity of his previous ﬁrm, ji;t 1. In practice, I do not have enough observations to be so ﬂexible. However, another paper could pool
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Seniority Effect
Some readers may be interested in how the functional form for the wage changes of employer switchers
relates to the literature on distinguishing the returns to total experience in the labor market (or age for workers
without career interruptions) from the returns to seniority (or tenure) at a particular employer (Topel, 1991;
Altonji and Williams, 1998). My assumption is that any seniority effect happens when a worker switches ﬁrms,
and afterwords that worker becomes a ﬁrm stayer and his wages increase with the random walk with drift
process for stayers. Figure 2 compares the wages of a career ﬁrm stayer to a worker who (say his wage at the
old ﬁrm was the same as a stayer at the new ﬁrm) moves to the ﬁrm (the dashed line) at time 2. At time 2, the
wage of the switcher is placed above or below the proﬁle of the stayer, but afterwords the switcher becomes a
stayer whose percentage wage increases are the same, in expectation. The port-of-entry seniority effect is the
degree that the wages of the switcher fall below the wages of the career stayer.15
Note that the structural model of employer choice is internally consistent. The key assumption is the wage
that enters the current period utility function (5) in Appendix A is the expected individual-speciﬁc wage for
selecting employer ji;t, or




wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

dwi;j;t:
This expectation is a function of the state variable of the worker, si;t, which includes his lagged wage and
his lagged employer choice. The force of the assumption is that workers do not receive speciﬁc wage offers
before deciding between employers.16 Instead, workers pick ﬁrms based upon individual-speciﬁc densities of
one-period-ahead and, through the dynamic programming problem, future wages.17
observations across groups in different ways to create more observations and make an origin-ﬁrm-speciﬁc treatment of wages possible.
15By “seniority effect”, I mean explaining how seniority plays a role in the wage process. I am not trying to specify a primitive concept
that can be precisely measured. The precise model of wages is the density f
 
wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

.
16More formally, the model does not include unobserved state variables that violate the conditional independence assumption of Rust
(1987) and hence directly affect the transition density of observed and unobserved state variables.
17A worker’s information set is smaller than in an endogenous censoring model where workers receive speciﬁc wage offers at all ﬁrms,
but more than in a search model where workers need to pay costs (or wait longer) before receiving any information on the wages at speciﬁc
ﬁrms.
115.4 Selection
The data include wage offers at only ﬁrms where workers accept employment. Readers familiar with the liter-
ature on endogenous censoring may be wondering why the empirical method does not use the employer choice
model to selection-correct the stochastic processes of wages at all ﬁrms. The answer is that the large number of
employer choices (more than 300 per ﬁve-year interval) in this application creates serious data hurdles, even be-
fore considering the extra complexities that the model in this paper emphasizes, such as dynamic programming,
the stochastic evolution of wages, and unobserved heterogeneity in the utility functions of workers.18
Parametric selection models (Heckman, 1974; Gronau, 1974) generally assume joint normality of the error
terms for the wages at (in my case) all employers and the taste shocks from (again in my case) all employer
choices. Because joint estimation of all equations is often computationally infeasible,19 researchers typically
estimate employer choice probabilities in a ﬁrst stage using the state variables of workers and related nonwage
employer characteristics (such as switching costs) as included covariates. In particular, next period’s wage
density at each of the ﬁrms is not part of the data used in the ﬁrst stage employer choice estimation. This means
that, in my employer choice problem, the ﬁrst stage reduced form must have enough observations to accurately
predict more than 300 employer choices per set of covariates without using the wages that are potentially strong
drivers of employer switching.20 The data on Swedish engineers do not have enough observations to accurately
estimate employer choice probabilities using reduced forms. This paper reverses the two stages recommended
by the selection-correction literature. Following the literature, such as Rust (1987), on estimating single-agent
dynamic programming models, I estimate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc stochastic processes of wages in the ﬁrst stage, and
then use those processes as inputs into the second stage estimation of the underlying preferences of workers
in my employer choice model.21 The empirical method’s focus on estimating worker preferences through
the revealed preferences from employer choices also contrasts with the literature on the structural estimation
of equilibrium search models, which most commonly uses theory to derive implications for the functional
form and interpretation of wage equations (van der Berg and Ridder, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002;
Woodcock, 2003).22
6 Data
In order to estimate my employer choice model, I need data that cover most employers that hire a particular
class of workers in a national labor market, that track workers as they switch employers, and that have multiple
workers per employer. In this section I detail data with these properties.
18Dahl (2002) estimates a selection model with many choices (the 50 American states). However, as he points out, he requires an
assumption that is inconsistent with the primitives of his economic model.
19The numerical integration required by the multivariate normal distribution suffers from a curse of dimensionality.
20HeckmanandHonore(1990)andHeckman(1990)investigatethenonparametricidentiﬁcationofendogenouscensoringmodels. Their
preferred identiﬁcation strategy is identiﬁcation at inﬁnity. A covariate Z that varies greatly over the sample is included in the employer
choice problem, and excluded from the wage equations. Z varies enough so that for some extreme values of Z, the employer choice is
made with certainty. In my application, worker age is a variable that varies over the sample. However, age cannot be excluded from the
wage equation, and variation in age affects the decision of whether to switch at all much more than the choice of the particular ﬁrm (out of
300) when switching.
21Heckman (1974), for example, uses a choice problem to get better estimates of the parameters in a wage regression. This paper uses
wage regressions to get estimates of the parameters of a choice problem.
22The empirical method also differs from search models by ignoring unemployment. The market for Swedish engineers had extremely
low unemployment during the sample period.
126.1 Overview
The data come from the Swedish Employers’ Federation (SAF in Swedish), an organization that represents
ﬁrms in negotiations with labor unions. The SAF is composed of industry-level employers’ federations, and
the data list the smaller federation an establishment belongs to. I use these sub-afﬁliations as my measure
of an establishment’s, and hence a worker’s, industry. Most of the engineers in the sample work in either
manufacturing or construction, although I include engineers in other industries as well.
The SAF data aim to cover all workers in member companies of the SAF from 1970–1990. Every year,
each establishment owned by a member company is asked to report information on the worker ID code, age,
monthly salary, education and sex of all white collar employees.23 As a result, the data track workers as they
move from employer to employer in the private sector, but cannot track workers if they leave the labor force
or switch to an uncovered sector.24 In practice, collection problems mean that not all establishments report
in every year. The data contain information on roughly 60% of the Swedish private sector work force.25 The
coverage rate for engineers in the private sector should be higher than 60% because they are more likely to be
employed by large manufacturing ﬁrms, which choose to join the SAF. Also, according to the current website
of the labor union for engineers, 79% of engineers work in the private sector.
The most serious problem affecting data coverage is that not all establishments report the educational
background of their workers. About 50% of workers in the data have reported educations. The establishments
reporting on education tend to focus on the need to employ highly educated workers. Therefore, studying a
group of highly educated workers such as engineers minimizes this coverage problem.26
I model workers as making employer decisions at each successive career stage. While I do not directly
observe total labor market experience, age is a good proxy for experience when workers have roughly the
same background and do not take time off from the labor market. Sweden had extremely low reported rates of
unemployment during the period (although some workers were in government training programs), and the rate
for the most highly educated workers is presumably lower. I consider only male engineers, who are less likely
to take time off from work for unmodeled family reasons. A typical male engineer needs to complete his ﬁve
years of university education and around a year of military service before entering the labor market. For this
reason I only include engineers aged 26 and higher. Many Swedish workers choose early retirement plans, and
I lose track of employees whose ﬁrms promote them to executive positions. For this reason, I do not model
workers older than 61, even though the mandatory retirement age is 65. Finally, I only include engineers who
work full-time, which is deﬁned by the SAF as working more than 35 hours in a week.27
Swedish ﬁrms pay engineers a straight monthly salary, which is the wage measure I use in this paper.28
While the data report contractual hours (usually 40) for white collar workers, contractual hours may be a poor
proxy for actual hours of work in an ofﬁce environment.29 The wage that enters the current period utility
23The data do not contain information on the personal characteristics of workers, such as their family status and nonwage income, or on
the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms.
24There is no particular age pattern for workers who leave the data, except for the expected spike at retirement.
25I calculate this based on numbers in Calmfors and Forslund (1990). The main exceptions are the banking industry, which is represented
by a different employers’ federation, ﬁrms that are cooperatively owned by their workers, and ﬁrms that do not belong to any employers’
federation. The data coverage is much better for workers in manufacturing.
26My attempts to accurately predict educational background from other covariates failed.
27Sweden was not a participant in World War II, so the war disrupted the careers of the relevant age cohorts less than the careers of
workers in some other countries. Sweden had no baby boom, although over time the government established new technical universities,
increasing the number of engineering graduates entering the labor market.
28As the dynamic programming problem uses a ﬁve-year interval, one approach might be to multiply the monthly salary by 512 = 60
months. The constant “60” will difference out when the utility of two ﬁrms are compared in the discrete choice problem, as log(60w) =
log60+logw.
29I equate the means and standard deviations of the engineering wages to their 1988 values. I do this instead of deﬂating by a price index
because the deﬂation makes the mean of the real wage distribution change over time, because the high inﬂation during the sample period
13function (5) is the log of the yearly salary.30
The SAF data do not follow workers before they enter the labor market, so this paper does not investigate
the initial decision of where to work. In a dynamic setting, all workers must pay a switching cost for this initial
employer choice. For brand new workers, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the stochastic process
for age–wage proﬁles at a particular ﬁrm may be especially high; ﬁrms may strongly compete to attract new
workers into potentially long careers inside a single ﬁrm.
6.2 Firm Estimation Sample
In my sample, 95% of the establishments employing engineers do not meet the criteria for estimating com-
pensation schemes using only within-ﬁrm variation. The most common problem is that there are very few
workers at an establishment and there is not someone who stayed at the establishment for the necessary length
of time in a particular age category. For the majority of establishments that do not meet the criteria, I pool them
into larger groups based upon region. Most of the establishments in the pooled groups are very small. These
estimation groups will be used only to estimate age–wage proﬁles; in the choice model below workers will be
able to choose from all ﬁrms, or at least a selection of real-life ﬁrms, as opposed to pooled groups of ﬁrms.
Switching between ﬁrms in the pooled categories is important, therefore I use pooling only for the necessary
steps of estimating the age–wage proﬁles.31 I require that ﬁrms that are not pooled by region have at least three
stayers (non-switchers) over the ﬁve-year cross-sectional time interval in each ﬁve-year worker-age interval.
Pooled ﬁrms are grouped by Swedish county.
There are an average of more than 1000 establishments employing engineers per year. Handling this many
choices in a nonlinear discrete choice model is computationally intensive. In order to increase the speed of
the estimation procedure, I narrow the sample by eliminating ﬁrms with less than four engineers in either the
start or end year of a two-year period. Table 1 lists sample statistics for ﬁrms employing engineers that are
valid choices in the employer switching model. Establishments that shut down are excluded as a result. Table
1 labels this truncated sample the estimation sample. From now on, all results use the estimation sample. Table
1 shows that many of the ﬁrms are in Stockholm County. The table also presents the number of establishments
in the two largest industries: “manufacturing” and “industry and chemicals.”
6.3 Worker Estimation Sample
The estimation sample covers 16,402 unique Swedish engineers. Each engineer is observed for an average of
5.3 (overlapping) ﬁve-year intervals.
Table2listsdescriptivestatisticsfortheengineersintheestimationsample. MonthlysalariesareinSwedish
crowns normalized to their value in 1988. The percentage growth in salaries reﬂects the average growth in the
normalized wage levels over ﬁve years; in this case it is 14%. The switching rate is the percentage of workers
who switch to another ﬁrm over a ﬁve-year period, with both the new and old ﬁrms remaining in business over
changed the real purchasing power of Swedish wages. The full-time, male engineers are highly committed to the labor market; I do not
model any labor-leisure substitution that a decrease in the real purchasing power of wages might induce.
30I have estimated speciﬁcations where the unlogged level of wages enters payoffs. This approach subsumes multiplicative constants
into bw, the parameter on wages in the current period utility function (5) in Appendix A. Multiplicative constants from period to period
include the the marginal tax rate paid on the incremental wage increase from an employer switch. By using the level of wages, I do not
need to model saving and borrowing, as workers care only about the present discounted value of consumption. Changing the curvature of
consumption in utility does not dramatically alter the ﬁnal elasticities of employer switching with respect to outside wage offers.
31When I pool for the purposes of estimating age–wage proﬁles, I still deﬁne movers and stayers using real-life establishments, and not
the pool deﬁnitions. One concern with pooling is that ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to play asymmetric strategies in order to create artiﬁcial
product differentiation in their age–wage proﬁles, even if the underlying fundamentals facing each ﬁrm are the same. Pooling eliminates
any ability to detect these asymmetries.
14Table 1: Facts About Firms: Mean Over Five-Year Time Intervals
Variable Estimation Sample
# of Establishments 337
Minimum Size for Inclusion 4
# of Pooled Groups 20.7
# of non-Pooled Firms 26.0
Total Estimation Groups 46.7
Mean # Engineers per Estab. 33.9
% of Estabs. in Stockholm County 32.4%
# of Estabs. in Small Counties 142
% of Estabs. in Manufacturing 36.6%
% of Estabs. in Industry and Chemicals 31.1%
For the age–wage proﬁle estimation, I pool ﬁrms lacking the right number and types of observations. An observation in this table (for the
statistics not involving pooled ﬁrms) is a non-pooled physical establishment over a ﬁve year period that appears in the estimation sample.
Remember that a dynamic programming model is separately solved for each ﬁve-year time interval.
Large counties are the 1990 administrative boundaries that include the cities of Goteburg, Stockholm and Malmo. Small counties
exclude those three cities.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics about Worker Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly Salary in 1988 Crowns 21,100 4970
Normalized Salary Percentage Increase (%) 13.3 14.0
Switching Rate (%) 14.1 34.8
Age 41.8 8.4
Large County (%) 58.5 49.2
Establishment Size (white-collar only) 1690 1980
Fellow Engineers at the Establishment 251 317
Total Worker Time Intervals 86,371
Total Unique Workers 16,402
Mean Time Intervals per Worker 5.27
This table uses the estimation sample. Large counties are the 1990 administrative boundaries that include the cities of Goteburg,
Stockholm and Malmo. The time interval is a ﬁve years. Time intervals overlap.
the period. In the estimation sample, engineers have a 14% probability of switching employers.32 The variable
large county is an indicator variable for working in one of the three largest metropolitan areas in Sweden.
A majority of Swedish engineers work in large counties. Establishment size is the number of other white
collar workers at a worker’s place of employment, while the number of engineers is the number of employees
with a ﬁve-year engineering degree at that establishment.33 Many of the engineers are employed at quite large
establishments: the mean engineer has 1690 fellow white-collar workers in his plant. Elite engineers in Sweden
tend to be employed by large, multinational manufacturing ﬁrms.
7 Estimates of Age-Wage Proﬁles
Section 5 describes how I use ﬁrst stage wage regressions to estimate the parameters qw that enter the normal,
one-period-ahead densities of wages, f
 
wi;j;t j wi;jt 1;t 1; ji;t; ji;t 1;ti; qw

. The age-speciﬁc densities create
32The number is higher when workers at ﬁrms that close down are counted as switchers. In this paper, I focus on voluntary switching.
33The estimation sample does not include all engineers as listed in Table 2, as I delete workers if they work part time, are female, or if
they were not in the data in the beginning of the ﬁve-year period.
15Table 3: Firm-Level Percentage Raises for Firm Stayers, by Worker Age
Measure Mean Estimate Std. Dev. Estimates
5 Year Percentage Increase Age 25-29 0.247 0.0650
5 Year Percentage Increase Age 30-39 0.151 0.0460
5 Year Percentage Increase Age 40-49 0.043 0.0490
5 Year Percentage Increase Age 50-59 -0.014 0.0583
Number of Estimation Groups - Time Intervals 701
Wages are in 1988 Swedish crowns. I do not weight by the size of estimation groups; only large estimation groups are included by
construction of the estimation groups, as the text discusses. This table reports the average means and average standard deviations across
estimation groups and time intervals. The standard deviation is the dispersion of the estimates across estimation groups, not a measure of
the statistical precision of individual coefﬁcients. Generally, the coefﬁcients are precisely estimated. I create the pooled estimation groups
to eliminate imprecise results, at the risk of not accurately capturing across-ﬁrm heterogeneity.
ﬁrm-speciﬁc stochastic processes for the wages of stayers and switchers. These stochastic processes are inputs
into the later employer choice model estimation. Estimation of the transition density of states in a ﬁrst stage
is a standard part of the approach taken in many single agent, discrete choice, dynamic programming models,
following Rust (1987).
7.1 Estimates for Stayers
As described in Section 5.2, I ﬁrst estimate (1) for workers who stay at the same ﬁrm. Table 3 lists estimates
of average ﬁve-year raises for engineers. I ﬁrst take within-ﬁrm averages, and then average those across ﬁrms
to calculate the numbers in Table 3. The main result in this table is that wage increases are much higher for
younger workers. Engineers who at the start of a ﬁve-year time interval are between 25 and 29 receive a
25% raise over the next ﬁve years. At the other extreme, engineers between the ages of 50 and 59 receive a
normalized wage reduction of 1%. These numbers, if graphed, would replicate the concave age–wage proﬁles
familiar to labor economists.
Figure 3 shows the histograms of the combined age and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. I create histograms where the
vertical axis is the fraction of pooled estimation groups that are in each bin. The horizontal axis is the mean
level of ﬁve-year wage increases for workers at a particular ﬁrm. I present a separate chart for each ﬁve-year age
interval.34 In general there appears to be important variation in the wage policies of Swedish ﬁrms, although I
suspect both the within-ﬁrm and between-ﬁrm variation in wages is less than in a more diverse labor market,
such as that found in the United States.
7.2 Do Raises Correlate with Lower Levels of Worker Turnover?
Having just estimated the age–wage proﬁles of ﬁrms for stayers, it is interesting to ask whether these proﬁles
are correlated with worker turnover. The identiﬁcation strategy in this paper relates both the decision of whether
to switch ﬁrms and the choice of destination ﬁrm to the wage differences across ﬁrms. For the paper to have
any hope at estimating the equivalent of labor supply elasticities, age–wage proﬁles of ﬁrm stayers should be
correlated with worker turnover, conditional on other ﬁrm and worker characteristics.
34Some of the heterogeneity reﬂects sampling error. As the sample size for each ﬁrm becomes large, this sampling error will be
eliminated. The two-stage (ﬁrst estimate wage policies, second estimate structural utility parameters) likelihood estimator is consistent,
but this sampling error remains in ﬁnite samples.
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Within−Firm Five−Year Percentage Wage Increase
An observation is a ﬁve-year percentage raise at a pooled estimation group.
First, a simpler version of the exercise would be to regress an indicator variable for a worker leaving an
employer on the individual employee’s wage level or the employer’s mean wage level. In a previous draft
of the paper, I reported an extensive set of these turnover regressions with varying set of employer and job
controls. These turnover regressions related to a recent literature that has estimated labor supply elasticities
by regressing separation on measures of a ﬁrm’s compensation policy (Hirsch, Schank and Schnabel, 2008;
Manning, 2003; Naidu, 2009; Ransom and Oaxaca, 2008; Ransom and Sims, 2008). The robust ﬁnding from
my Swedish regressions is that ﬁrms with higher wages have about the same levels of turnover as ﬁrms with
lower wages. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the ﬁrst-order explanation for differences in wages for
workers in this Swedish dataset is unobserved heterogeneity in worker ability; wage differences that reﬂect
unobserved heterogeneity could be uncorrelated with separation.
Instead, this paper focuses on the rate of wage increases across ﬁrms. Looking at percentage raises controls
for unobserved heterogeneity in worker ability, as any time invariant worker ability in wage levels is differenced
out. Here, I compute a notion of a ﬁrm j’s career-long percentage (really log) wage increase (the slope of wages
with age or experience), as formed for a cross-section of workers in different ages in ﬁve-year period y, as
log_wage_increasej;y  gj;2529;y+2gj;3039;y+2gj;4049;y+2gj;5059;y;
where the compensation-scheme parameters were estimated in the previous section. For each worker in the
estimation sample, I regress the binary variable equal to 1 if worker i switches ﬁrms during the period y on
log_wage_increasej;y for worker i’s initial employer j as well year ﬁxed effects, worker age ﬁxed effects,
geographic region (county) ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects, and the logarithm of plant size. Clustering the
standard errors at the ﬁrm (estimation group) level, this regression yields a point estimate of -0.029 with a
standard error of 0.0151 and a p-value of 0.056. The mean of log_wage_increasej;y is 0.558 and its standard
deviation is 0.352. So an employer with a one-standard deviation higher wage slope is predicted to have a
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Residuals from regressing career salary increase on controls
An observation corresponds to a pair of a ﬁve-year interval and a particular estimation group. The horizontal axis reports the computed,
predicted percentage raise over a career at a particular ﬁrm. The vertical axis reports the mean level of turnover at a particular estimation
group. Both the vertical and the horizontal axes are means of residuals, where the means are calculated across workers within the same
time interval and estimation group. The residuals arise from regressions of turnover and age–wage proﬁles on employer and worker
characteristics other than wages, as described in the text.
lower worker turnover level of  0:02910:352 = 0:01, or 0.01 out of a mean turnover rate of 0.14, which
is equivalent to a 0:01=0:14 = 7% decrease from the base turnover level. This is a reasonably substantial
economic magnitude. This correlation in the data should not be interpreted as a causal labor supply elasticity,
as the wage policies of competing ﬁrms are key omitted variables that are correlated with the ﬁrm in question’s
wage policies.
To display the correlation between wage policies and turnover graphically, I compute mean turnover levels
for each plant j and ﬁve-year period y and relate them to log_wage_increasej;y. Because the controls in the
individual-levelregressionarerelevant, Iﬁrstseparablyregressthebinaryturnovervariableandlog_wage_increasej;y
on all the controls, except log_wage_increasej;y. I then compute the residuals from the turnover regression and
from the log_wage_increasej;y regression. Regressing the turnover residuals on the log_wage_increasej;y resid-
uals would exactly reproduce the coefﬁcient -0.029, according to well-known Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem.
However, for graphical representation I instead compute the mean of the turnover residuals and the mean of the
log_wage_increasej;y residuals, for each ﬁrm j and ﬁve-year time interval y.
Figure4plotseachﬁrm’smeanturnoverresidualsontheverticalaxisandeachﬁrm’smeanlog_wage_increasej;y
residuals on the horizontal axis, as well as a best ﬁt regression line. The coefﬁcient on log_wage_increasej;y is
-0.035, which is quite similar to the coefﬁcient on -0.029 from the worker-level regression. The ﬁgure shows
quite substantial heterogeneity in wage policies across ﬁrms and a negative correlation of those wage policies
with turnover levels, after adjusting for other worker and employer characteristics. However, the statistical ﬁt
of the regression line suggests other factors than wage policies affect ﬁrm turnover rates. I will reproduce this
ﬁgure using the output of the model in order to assess the model’s ﬁt, later.
18Table 4: Contribution of Old Firms’ and New Firms’ Wages for Firm Switchers, by Worker Age
% Hypothetical Wage % Hypothetical Wage
in the Old Firm in the New Firm
Age Group in Start Year Mean Est. Std. Dev. Est. Mean Est. Std. Dev. Est.
Age 25-29 0.640 0.0567 0.361 0.0568
Age 30-39 0.766 0.0305 0.237 0.0302
Age 40-49 0.819 0.0951 0.185 0.0922
Age 50-59 0.904 0.160 0.094 0.161
# of Switchers per Time Interval 818 (std. dev. = 185)
Five-Year Intervals 15
This table reports the average results of one regression for each ﬁve-year period. The averages are computed across the ﬁve-year periods.
The sample is all employer switchers. The standard deviations are taken across ﬁve-year periods. In general, regression coefﬁcients that
look different from zero are estimated to be statistically different from zero. The dependent variable is the wage of a switcher. The
deﬁnition of the measures of the hypothetical wages are in Section 5.3.
7.3 Estimates for Switchers
In order to fully specify the age–wage proﬁles of ﬁrms, I also need to estimate the policies ﬁrms use to assign
wages to workers who switch ﬁrms. I discuss the functional form choices that I make in Section 5.3.
Table 4 lists the average slope coefﬁcients from the regression of the wages of switchers on measures of
hypothetical wages using the old and new ﬁrms’ age–wage proﬁles for stayers. The average is taken across
ﬁve-year periods. I let the coefﬁcients vary by worker age. The main result is that the wage of an older switcher
seems to be based much more on the wage policies of his old employer. For example, 64% of the wage of a
younger engineer who switches is based upon his predicted wage at his old ﬁrm, while 90% of the wage of
an older engineer who switches is based upon his predicted wage at his old employer. While some part of
the wages of a ﬁrm switcher is due to the unique age–wage proﬁle of his new ﬁrm, the majority of the wage
is based upon the worker’s past history in the labor market. A theoretical explanation is that information is
revealed about a worker’s ability that cannot be erased by switching ﬁrms. This information accumulates as
a worker ages; by the end of a worker’s life his wage is speciﬁc to him and not subject to much variation on
the market. This means that the window of higher wage opportunities from switching employers seems to be
open only for younger workers. This ﬁnding is consistent with a story where the few older workers who switch
move to similar positions at other ﬁrms. In unreported empirical work, I have shown that the job assignments
of older workers tend to be stable before and after employer switches.
As far as I am aware, Table 4 shows the ﬁrst results in the literature to analyze the wage changes of job-
to-job switchers in the context of the speciﬁc wage policies of the old and new ﬁrms. Previous papers have
not been able to distinguish between the part of wage change upon an employer switch speciﬁcally due to a
recruitment bonus or penalty paid to switchers, and the portion due to the unique age–wage proﬁles of the old
and new ﬁrms. Table 4 shows that for older workers, there is little or no return to switching; older switchers
receive the same raises that they would have earned at their previous employers.
A younger worker who switches to a high paying new ﬁrm can see a substantial wage increase, but only
because the new ﬁrm pays all young workers a higher wage. Because the coefﬁcients on the hypothetical old
and new wages tend to sum to close to 1, there is no large wage gain from switching in and of itself.35 Young
35If instead the coefﬁcients on the new and old wages had a sum of 1.5, a worker switching to a ﬁrm that pays the same wage as his
19workers who switch to a new ﬁrm will be placed at about the same wage level as existing workers, subject to
some adjustments based upon the wage history of the young worker at his old ﬁrm. In other words, the return
to seniority (or tenure) highlighted in the literature would appear to be about zero. The returns to seniority for
older workers are also zero, as the wages of older workers change little upon employer switching. In this model,
the substantial wage differences seen in older workers are due almost entirely to past labor market histories and
are not accentuated by late-career employer switches.36
8 Employer Choice Model Estimates
8.1 Overview
The purpose of the dynamic model of employer choice is to estimate the utility function parameters for each
worker type, bk, and the population frequency of each type, pk. These parameters are described in Appendix
A. With these parameters, I calculate the fraction of Swedish engineers who respond to unilateral outside wage
offers. As the introduction discusses, having a large group of marginal workers who are sensitive to wage offers
is needed for a spot market for experienced labor that responds to supply and demand shocks. Otherwise, all
workers are locked into their current employers, and wages and employment decisions will not necessarily
adjust to shocks.
Table 5 describes the parametrization of the current period utility function and the type frequencies. Be-
cause of the curse of dimensionality in nonlinear optimization, I cannot be perfectly ﬂexible in including all
possible parameters, but I try to span the parameter space by a judicious choice of parameters that vary by type
and age. I allow for three types of worker preferences to capture heterogeneity in worker preferences. A type k
is distinguished by separate wage parameter (the most important parameter in the model) and a base switching
cost. Other switching costs vary by age in order to ﬁt the declining pattern of turnover, but not by type in order
to speed estimation. I add ﬂexibility in age to ﬁt the well-known pattern that employer switching decreases
with worker age. The discount factor is 0.96, or a 4% real annual interest rate.37
Note that a high level of employer switching does not necessarily imply that the sensitivity of switching
to outside wage offers is large. In the model, employer switching happens for nonwage reasons such as the
taste shocks in the current period utility function. A labor market with lots of switching, but little sensitivity to
wages, implies that ﬁrms cannot recruit experienced workers through wage increases. Also note that the ability
of across-ﬁrm wage heterogeneity in Sweden to identify the effect of wages on employer choice will be seen
in the standard errors of the reported statistics. The utility function parameters and type probabilities turn out
to be precisely estimated.
previous employer to stayers would end up paying 1.5 times the previous wage to a switcher. There would be a direct beneﬁt of switching
ﬁrms, even if the new and old ﬁrms have similar wage policies for stayers.
36Table 4 shows that the gains from switching ﬁrms decreases with age. If this estimate is incorrect, it might seem that this wage process
will lead to upward biased estimates of the sensitivity of switching to wages, as the real wage gains available to switchers are larger, so
workers will appear to be over-sensitive to the smaller, predicted wage differences. On the other hand and as stated previously, these are
estimated off of the sample of switchers and are not selection-corrected, because of the difﬁculty in jointly estimating wages and employer
choice and because of the lack of natural variables included in employer choice but excluded from the wage process. This lack of selection
correction might overstate wage gains to switchers, leading to an underestimate of the sensitivity of switching to wages. So, various biases
can lead to under or overestimates of the sensitivity of switching to wages.
37Because age–wage proﬁles are nonstationary, the choice of the discount factor affects the estimates of the parameters on wages, 
bw;k
	K
k=1. There is no way around this. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) discuss why identiﬁcation of the current period utilities requires
assuming a value for the discount factor. An econometrician can attempt to estimate the discount factor if state variables that are not
payoff-relevant in the current period are observed. There are no such state variables in the employer switching application.
20Table 5: Parameters of the Employer Choice Model
Variable Category Deﬁnition How Params. Vary Number Included
Discount Factor 0.85 1
Wage Coefﬁcients E[wi;j;t j si;t; ji;t], wage logged By type 3
Switching Costs:
Geographic Distance log of distance between regions By age 7
Base Switching Cost 1 if switch ﬁrms By type + By age 3 + 6
Legal Corporation Change 1 if new ﬁrm not same corp. By age 7
Industry Change 1 if new industry By age 7
Firm Size # of total white collar workers By age 7
Type Probabilities prob. of being speciﬁc type By type 2
Total Estimated Parameters 42
The discount factor is not included in the total parameter count.
The total base switching cost is equal to the cost for the speciﬁc type plus an extra age-speciﬁc amount common to all types.
The type probabilities must sum to 1, so one type is excluded.
8.2 Model Fit
I choose the speciﬁc parametrization of the model to match certain patterns in the data. For example, the
switchingcostsareallowedtobehigherwhenaworkerswitchesindustriesbecauseswitchesbetweenindustries
are empirically less likely than switches within industries. All of these patterns will not be discussed for
conciseness. In general, aspects of the data the model is designed to match end up being matched well.
This section analyzes to what extent the model ﬁts two basic patterns in the data. Note that it is simple
to ﬁt the data with a ﬂexible model (say some histogram), but the dynamic programming model in this paper
puts a premium on economic complexity to make better predictions about worker behavior in out-of-sample
situations. Still, some key aspects of the data are matched well by this very parsimonious choice model.
Perhaps the most widely known fact about employer switching is that it declines with worker age (Farber,
1999). Themodelincludesseveralfeaturestoallowfordecreasingswitchingwithage. Thestochasticprocesses
for age–wage proﬁles offered by ﬁrms and the switching costs of workers vary by worker age. In addition, the
dynamic programming model with a mandatory retirement date assumes that younger workers have longer
remaining careers to enjoy wage gains.
Table 6 presents the empirical and predicted probabilities of a worker of a given age staying at his ﬁrm
for a ﬁve-year period.38 The model ﬁts the broad pattern of the switching probability decline with age quite
well. However, in percentage terms, the ﬁt of each cell is off. For example, the switching rate of 0.091
for age 40–44 workers is 1 0:091=0:122 = 25% off of the value. These ﬁt errors come from the tightly
parameterizedstructuralmodel, whichfocusesonmodelingaricheconomicchoiceprocessinsteadofincluding
lots of parameters in the utility function. Including more age-speciﬁc or type-speciﬁc parameters could improve
the ﬁt by age, although I do not pursue this as previous increases in the number of model parameters have
not qualitatively altered the conclusions about switching costs and the sensitivity of employer switching to
compensation policies.39
The key idea behind the model is that ﬁrms that increase their percentage raises should decrease their
turnover levels. Figure 4 demonstrated a related correlation in the data: ﬁrms with higher raises have lower
turnover. Figure 5 reproduces Figure 4 except that the turnover level is the mean turnover level at each plant
38The model predictions average over the actual state variables, si;t, in the data. To compute the ﬁt, the dynamic program must be solved.
39Further, the likelihood criterion promotes matching the destination ﬁrm chosen by the worker, not just whether the worker switches at
all. I discuss a speciﬁcation using only the separation decision below.
21Table 6: Empirical and Predicted Probabilities of Not Switching, by Worker Age Category








The empirical turnover probabilities use only the sample used in the estimation. The predicted turnover probabilities are the model
probabilities summed over the data points.
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Residuals from regressing career salary increase on controls
An observation is a ﬁve-year computed wage policy and turnover level at a particular estimation group. The predicted turnover
probabilities in each ﬁrm are the model probabilities summed over the estimation groups.
that is predicted by the model. The scale of Figure 5 is the same as Figure 4, for comparison. The wage policies
on the horizontal axis are also exactly the same. Figure 5 plots the residuals from regressions of the variables
of interest on the same set of controls used in Figure 4.
Unsurprisingly, looking at only the vertical axis shows that there is less variation in predicted turnover
levels, those in Figure 5, than in actual turnover levels, those in Figure 4. Actual turnover levels are governed
by factors outside the model and further have greater variability because of statistical sampling error: a ﬁnite
number of workers are employed at each ﬁrm.
The slope of the best-ﬁt regression line is -0.017 in Figure 5, half the value of -0.035 in Figure 4 and also
less than the -0.029 coefﬁcient from the worker-level regression, as reported in Section 7.2. The reason for
the lower magnitude is the lack of dispersion in turnover rates across ﬁrms, as predicted by the model. Using





Let me decompose the slope coefﬁcients in Figures 4 and 5 into these three components. By construction, the x
values, log_wage_increasej;y, are identical between Figure 4 and 5. It turns out that the magnitude of Corr(x;z)
is only slightly smaller in magnitude when turnover is predicted from the model, -0.123, then when turnover is
estimated from the data, -0.139. The model ﬁts the correlation between turnover rates and wage rates seen in
the data. The regression coefﬁcient is of muted magnitude in Figure 5 mainly because the standard deviation
of turnover levels across ﬁrms is quite higher in the data, 0.070, than in the model’s predictions, 0.039. Thus
SD(z) varies a lot between the ﬁgures. As stated above, both sampling error in the estimation of mean turnover
at each ﬁrm and factors outside of the model contribute to variability in estimated turnover rates that the model
cannot hope to reproduce. As the correlation between turnover and age–wage proﬁles is about the same in the
model’s predictions and in the data, I interpret the ﬁgures as showing the model is able to ﬁt the across-ﬁrm
evidence on turnover patterns quite well.
Note that neither Figure 4 nor Figure 5 should be interpreted as causal estimates of labor supply elasticities.
Both ﬁgures do not control for a key omitted variable: the wage policies of competing employers. Those wage
policies are used in the estimation of the structural model, and the response of employer switching to wages is
discussed below, in Section 8.4.
8.3 Switching Costs Relative to Taste Shocks
Rather than simply itemizing the estimated parameters, I report their implications in terms of the dependent
variable, employer choice. Comparing estimates of parameters in the linear index of the current period utility
function can be misleading when the linear index is only one part of a highly nonlinear, dynamic programming,
discrete choice model. Because a ﬁrst order cause of wage setting in Sweden is bargaining with labor unions,
I do not use my parameter estimates to explain wage setting by ﬁrms or region- and industry-speciﬁc turnover
patterns for engineers in Sweden. Rather, I use the estimated parameters to calculate employer switching
patterns under ﬁve alternative scenarios. The scenarios are intentionally stylized in order to focus on the main
implications of the parameter estimates.
Each scenario is a counterfactual that requires solving the dynamic programming problem for all three
worker types and a given placement of ﬁrms in characteristic space. I assume that there are 400 total ﬁrms.40
Each ﬁrm offers the same stochastic process for age–wage proﬁles, which I take from the estimates from
Section 7. All workers enter the labor market at age 26 with a starting wage of 16,800 crowns. When I break
out the results by worker type, I assume all engineers are of the given type.
Each of the ﬁve scenarios is deﬁned by the amount of (symmetric) differentiation in nonwage employer
characteristics. In the ﬁrst scenario, all ﬁrms are 1 km apart, in the same industry and owned by the same
parent corporation. The next three scenarios each modify one of these choices at a time. The second scenario
is the same as the ﬁrst except the ﬁrms are independently owned. The third scenario has all the ﬁrms be in
different industries. In the fourth scenario, all ﬁrms are 100 km apart. Finally, the ﬁfth scenario modiﬁes all
three elements at once: the ﬁrms are in different industries, the ﬁrms are owned by different parent corporations,
and all ﬁrms are 100 km apart.
40Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) point out the importance of keeping the number of consumer choices relatively ﬁxed in the static logit
model. There are a mean 348 ﬁrms per time interval in the estimation sample.
23Table 7: Probabilities of Switching from a Representative Firm, Under Five Scenarios
Hypothetical Switches Type I (prob 0.59) Type II (prob 0.12) Type III (prob 0.29)
Change Change Move Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
Company Industry Distance 25-29 35-39 50-55 25-29 35-39 50-55 25-29 35-39 50-55
N N 1 km 0.26 0.10 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.92
Y N 1 km 0.03 0.01 ~0 0.99 0.93 0.44 0.91 0.65 0.10
N Y 1 km 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.93
N N 100 km 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.87
Y Y 100 km ~0 ~0 ~0 0.72 0.69 0.36 0.26 0.23 0.07
These results are derived from the solving the dynamic program for each scenario and worker type. The numbers reported are the
probabilities of choosing a ﬁrm other than the representative ﬁrm conditional on being previously employed at the representative ﬁrm with
a wage on the average proﬁle of career stayers, as shown in Figure 1. In general, the switching costs, and hence these reported statistics,
are precisely estimated.
The purpose of the scenarios is to relate switching costs to turnover patterns. I include switching costs in
the current period utility function (5) in Appendix A to stand in for many explanations for why most workers do
not switch employers in a given period. These other explanations include matching and search costs. Without
switching costs, workers will instantaneously switch ﬁrms in order to arbitrage away wage differences.
I report statistics from the point of view of a representative ﬁrm. Table 7 reports estimates of the probability
ofaworkeratofagivenageleavingtherepresentativeﬁrm, undereachscenario. Theprobabilitiesareevaluated
at the average wage of a career stayer of the particular age.41 Note that this probability compares the switching
costs to the assumed i.i.d. logit distribution for the taste shocks. If switching costs are zero, the probability
of staying at the representative ﬁrm is 1=400 = 0:0025 each period. For comparison purposes, the empirical
probability of Swedish engineers staying over ﬁve years is 0.86.
Type I workers are 59% of Swedish engineers. The ﬁrst scenario in Table 7 shows that if 400 alternative
employers in the same industry and owned by the same parent corporation are located across the street from
the representative ﬁrm, 26% of the ﬁrm’s youngest Type I engineers will leave. If the other employers are all
owned by different parent corporations, only 3% will switch. If the alternative employers are all in unique
industries, the youngest Type I workers will leave 6% of the time. If the 400 alternative employers are 100
km away from each other (the fourth scenario), 6% of each ﬁrm’s Type I engineers will still switch. The ﬁnal
scenario says that no workers switch when the 400 alternative employers are 100 km away, in unique industries
and independently owned. Type I workers have moderately high switching costs.
The 12% of engineers who are Type II workers and the 29% that are Type III workers have lower switching
costs than Type I workers. Almost 100% of young Type II and III workers will switch ﬁrms under the ﬁrst
scenario. Switching rates decline with the scenarios, but not until the ﬁfth and ﬁnal scenario are the switching
rates for the youngest engineers less than 90%, over ﬁve years. If all ﬁrms are 100 km away, in unique industries
and independently owned, 72% of young Type I engineers and 26% of young Type II engineers will switch.
The overall level of switching under each scenario is calculated by multiplying the type-speciﬁc switching
probabilities by the corresponding type frequencies. For example, the overall level of switching from the
representative ﬁrm for age 35–39 workers under the ﬁfth scenario is
0:590:0+0:120:69+0:290:23 = 0:15:
This overall probability of staying may be more representative of worker behavior from a ﬁrm’s point of view,
41See Figure 1 for a picture of this notion of an average proﬁle.
24because the model assumes that the stochastic process of wages is not a function of worker types. Because
only 15% of age 35–39 workers switch under this scenario, I estimate switching costs to be very important,
compared to logit taste shocks. This paper is part of a growing literature that estimates high switching costs
for various consumer choices, using individual-level panel data (Greenstein, 1993; Shum, 2004; Moshkin and
Shachar, 2002; Goldfarb, 2006; Kennan and Walker, 2009).
Table7showsthatolderworkershave, roughly, higherswitchingcoststhanyoungerworkers. Theestimates
matchthedata, whereolderworkersswitchlessthanyoungerworkers. Theswitchingcostsparameterestimates
do not line up exactly with empirical turnover patterns, as in the model wage changes and lifetime career
horizons to enjoy wage gains also cause younger workers to switch more often.
8.4 Unilateral Wage Changes
One goal of this paper is to see whether experienced workers respond to unilateral wage increases. This section
answers this question by examining how switching changes when one particular ﬁrm unilaterally makes its
stochastic process for age–wage proﬁles more lucrative.
While the actual ﬁve-year raise depends upon the age of the worker, the additional amount of the raise
in my experiment is the same percentage for all workers. Let the new raises be gj;t +D, where D does not
depend on age, t. Let P
 
ji;t 1 j ji;t 1;ti;wi;j;t 1; bk;qw

be the employer choice model’s predicted probability
of remaining at the current ﬁrm for worker i of age t and for ji;t = ji;t 1, the previous employer. Then the
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
is the probability of switching and Ij;t is the number of workers of
age category t in ﬁrm j. I compute the marginal switching effect using a numerical derivative. To compute the
marginal switching effect, I solve the dynamic program for each worker type twice, once for D = 0 and once
for a small D > 0. I take the difference in 1 P
 
ji;t 1 j ji;t 1;ti;wi;j;t 1; bk;qw

as the change in switching. As
I compute the marginal switching effect for each ﬁrm separately, I must solve each type’s dynamic program for
each of the ﬁrms in the data.42
After computing (3), I multiply it by D=0:01 to judge the economic signiﬁcance of the marginal switching
effects. For reference purposes, it is important to understand the economic magnitudes of the units that I use
to report the marginal switching effects. First it is necessary to know when a change in age–wage proﬁles of
D = 0:01 represents a signiﬁcant amount of money. I argue that increasing each of a ﬁrm’s ﬁve-year wage
increases by 0.01 is not inexpensive. Table 2 shows that the average average ﬁve-year wage increase rate for
engineers is 0.133. Increasing this amount by 0.01 amounts to about a 0:01=0:133  8% hike in the amount
of the raise. Furthermore, young workers continue to receive larger raises over the remainder of their careers,
so the compounding of this compensation scheme change means that a new 25 year old worker will receive a
much higher base salary at the time he retires. For this expensive age–wage proﬁle change to be worthwhile,
it must affect employer switching signiﬁcantly. Table 2 also shows that the average turnover rate for engineers
is 0.141. In order for my hypothetical compensation scheme change to reduce the average turnover rate by a
fourth (by 0.035), the marginal switching effect must be -3.5. As a rough estimate, I say any marginal switching
42Using the delta method to compute standard errors for the marginal switching effects raises the number of dynamic programming
problems by a multiple equal to the number of estimated parameters whose distribution is used to compute the standard errors.
25Table 8: Marginal Switching Effects for Increasing the Rate of Wage Increases for all Age Groups
Type I (prob 0.59) Type II (prob 0.12) Type III (prob 0.29)
Starting Age Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
25-29 0.314 0.091 0.001 0.155 -1.42 0.486
30-34 0.080 0.017 0.002 0.268 -1.81 0.673
35-39 0.048 0.014 0.003 0.375 -1.79 0.618
40-44 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.506 -1.66 0.656
45-49 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.515 -1.02 0.419
50-54 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.406 -0.433 0.145
55-59 0.001 ~0.0 0.002 0.234 -0.165 0.055
These effects are from (3). The standard errors of the effects are calculated using the delta method, where I account for estimation error
in only the coefﬁcient on wages in the utility function. This parameter has by far the largest impact on the marginal switching effects.
Applying the delta method to account for variation in all of the parameter estimates is computationally prohibitive. The standard errors
also do not account for the overlapping nature of the 15 time intervals and any ﬁrst-stage estimation error in the age–wage proﬁles.
effect over -2.0 is cost-effective.43
Table 8 reports the marginal switching effects for engineers. The effects are listed by worker age. To be
precise, I calculate (3) by numerical differentiation for each of the, on average, 348 ﬁrms per ﬁve-year time
interval.44 I then average within and then across the ﬁfteen time intervals, and I apply the delta method to
get the means and standard errors reported in the table. To recap Table 7’s results on switching costs, Type
I workers (59% of the population) have high switching costs, and younger Type II and III workers have low
switching costs that will increase with age.
The ﬁrst columns of Table 8 show that Type I workers have precisely estimated but very small marginal
switching effects. Even the largest effect, 0.314 for the youngest Type I workers, is far below (in absolute
magnitude) the -2.0 effect that I regard as economically meaningful. The effects are the opposite sign as the
theory that workers will prefer to stay at a ﬁrm if they are offered higher wages predicts, but as the estimated
effects are so small, I am not concerned. The bottom line is that Type I workers, who are the majority group
(59% of all engineers) in the population, are not likely to voluntarily switch from the current employer under
any situation.
Table 8 shows that the marginal switching effects for Type II workers, 12% of the population, are estimated
to be almost exactly zero with large standard errors. While from Table 7 we know that Type II workers have
low switching costs, it appears that the available data on Swedish engineers are not suitable for determining
whether Type II workers switch employers for wage gains. This lack of statistical precision may be related to
the fact that wage dispersion across Swedish ﬁrms is presumably less than that in the United States, because
of the system of national wage bargaining in place during my sample period. I can still use the estimated
standard errors to construct 95% conﬁdence intervals around the estimates. All the conﬁdence intervals are
almost within the interval -1.0 to 1.0. My benchmark for a economically signiﬁcant marginal switching effect
is -2.0, so I can rule out with conﬁdence that Type II workers have large sensitivities to wages.
Finally, Table 8 shows that the 29% of all Swedish engineers who are Type III workers are the only ones
43I can report elasticities instead of marginal effects. To compute an elasticity, I might take the weighted average of the marginal
switching effects and multiply it by the ratio of the average log-wage increase to the turnover rate over the ﬁve-year time interval. I ﬁnd the
interpretation of the elasticities confusing, because I have to consider percentages of percentages such as turnover rates and raises. For this
reason, I report only the marginal switching effects, although readers should know that I can easily transform the results into elasticities
that convey the same information.
44There are never workers of all age groups at every single ﬁrm in a time interval, so in practice I always take the within-time-interval
average over less than the total number of ﬁrms.
26who are especially sensitive to wages. Type III workers have marginal switching effects around -1.0 that are
statistically different from zero at traditional levels. The largest (in absolute value) 95% conﬁdence bound
for any of the age groups is -3.1, so I cannot reject the hypothesis that Type III workers’ marginal switching
effects are the benchmark of -2.0. I can, however, argue that the effects are less than my benchmark for a larger
effect, which is -3.5. In summary, Type III workers are deﬁnitely willing to switch for wage gains, but their
responses are not as large as would be predicted by traditional theories of inﬁnitely elastic labor supply curves
to individual ﬁrms.
Table 8 shows that, in general, Type III workers in the earlier part of their career are more sensitive to
changesinfuturecompensationschemesthanareolderworkers. Fortheoldestengineers, theproposedincrease
in raises of 0.01 decreases their probability of switching by 0.0017, compared to 0.142 for age 25–29 workers.
0.0017 is a small decrease. If ﬁrms are trying to retain their workers with age–wage proﬁles, it appears that
only workers in the earlier parts of their careers will respond. This may not be problematic from the ﬁrms’
perspectives, as young workers are more likely to switch, as Table 6 shows.
8.5 Estimating the Model Using Only the Separation Decision
As argued previously, compared to other labor markets, the Swedish labor market for elite engineers corre-
sponds more to a market where the wages of workers are below their productivities, so that the market could
be better modeled as workers choosing ﬁrms given the ﬁrms’ compensation policies. Still, a model of volun-
tary employment choice is indeed strong when the true model probably incorporates some degree of two-sided
matching.
In this subsection, I re-estimate the economic choice model in this paper, using only the dependent variable
of whether or not to separate from a ﬁrm. The economic model is the same: the worker picks between around
300 employers in the Swedish economy. The measured dependent variable is not the individual ﬁrm ji;t that
worker i chooses at age t but the binary decision of whether to stay at the current ﬁrm, ji;t = ji;t 1, or to move
to another ﬁrm, ji;t 6= ji;t 1.45 The economic model is identical to before. The separation-only likelihood is
reported in Appendix A.5.
Table 9 lists the marginal switching effects for the speciﬁcation where separation is the dependent vari-
able.46 The Type I workers now compromise 64% of the population and are even closer to 0 in their sensitivity
to moving. On the other hand, the Type III workers compromise 25% of the population and now are more
sensitive to outside wage offers. With the identity of the destination ﬁrm used as a dependent variable, Table 8
reported that an age 40–44 worker has a marginal switching effect of -1.66. In Table 9, the age 40–44 marginal
switching effect increases to -2.52. The strangest occurrence is the 11% of workers who are Type II workers,
who now are seen to dislike wages. Increasing future wages for these workers will encourage them to leave the
ﬁrm. This theoretically implausible result occurs when only the separation decision is used as the dependent
variable.
Overall, the results for Type I and Type III workers paint a theoretically similar picture to the results
with the destination ﬁrm in the dependent variable. Only the 11% of Type II workers, who in Table 8 had
economically zero but statistically imprecise marginal switching effects, now behave in a substantially, and
theoretically implausible, different way. Keep in mind that the two economic models are the same: the worker
picks between all available ﬁrms given how Section 7.3 predicts wages will change when a worker moves from
45The independently-developed model of Kennan and Walker (2009) ﬁrst estimated a (in their case, geographic) switching model using
only the separation decision.
46The parameter estimates in Table 9 come from one run of the optimization package, where the starting values for the solver come from
the structural parameter values for the model with both separation and the identity of the destination ﬁrm used as dependent variables.
27Table 9: Model with Separation as the Dependent Variable: Marginal Switching Effects for Increasing the Rate
of Wage Increases for all Age Groups
Type I (prob 0.64) Type II (prob 0.11) Type III (prob 0.25)
Starting Age Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
25-29 0.109 0.009 0.512 0.021 -2.352 0.190
30-34 0.051 0.002 1.068 0.087 -3.021 0.418
35-39 0.038 0.001 1.446 0.153 -2.612 0.266
40-44 0.020 0.000 1.667 0.168 -2.521 0.358
45-49 0.013 0.000 2.037 0.228 -2.292 0.325
50-54 0.005 0.000 1.724 0.177 -0.778 0.023
55-59 0.002 0.000 0.981 0.067 -0.305 0.003
These effects are from (3). The standard errors of the effects are calculated using the delta method, where I account for estimation error
in only the coefﬁcient on wages in the utility function. This parameter has by far the largest impact on the marginal switching effects.
Applying the delta method to account for variation in all of the parameter estimates is computationally prohibitive. The standard errors
also do not account for the overlapping nature of the 15 time intervals and any ﬁrst-stage estimation error in the age–wage proﬁles.
one stochastic process for age-wage proﬁles to another ﬁrm’s stochastic process for age-wage proﬁles. The
results show that using data on the destination ﬁrm can improve on the estimates from a speciﬁcation that uses
only separation decisions.47
9 Discussion of the Results
9.1 Overview of the Results
The structural results of this paper are the estimates of the effects of switching costs and unilateral wage
changes, Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Two of three estimated types (41% of workers) have relatively low
switching costs, but only the Type III workers, 29% of the engineers, are responsive to wages. While my results
do not conﬁrm theories that assume experienced workers are perfectly mobile across ﬁrms, it does appear as if
a minority of experienced engineers are willing to switch ﬁrms under the right circumstances, especially when
young.
9.2 Monopsony Labor Market Equilibria
Standard models of monopsony48 in the labor market (Boal and Ransom, 1997; Manning, 2003) suggest that a
ﬁrm should choose a ﬁxed wage level w so that the inverse of its elasticity of labor supply with respect to the







where the MPL is the marginal product of labor, eL;w is the elasticity of labor supply, and wage is the wage.
The quantity on the right of the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition is labeled the “exploitation index”, because it
47This is not to say that the separation decision is not an important aspect of the dependent variable; it is important. For example, using
observations only on switchers leads to a selected sample and biased estimates. Furthermore, the base switching cost, a key part of the
model, cannot be identiﬁed without data on workers who do not switch. Nor can we identify age-speciﬁc base switching costs, which are
needed to ﬁt the empirical evidence on switching rates that decline with worker age.
48Here, the term monopsony refers to imperfect competition, rather than only the special case of one employer.
28describes how much ﬁrms “exploit” workers by paying less than the workers’ marginal products of labor. This
monopsony theory says that ﬁrms should only hire the workers with a great nonwage desire to work at the ﬁrm,
and then pay these workers lower wages in order to earn higher proﬁts. The key unknown parameter in this
market equilibrium model is the elasticity of labor supply.
The static oligopsony model is probably a poor approximation of wage setting in the unionized Swedish
economy. However, the utility function parameters of workers should be relatively invariant to the particular
national labor market being considered. My parameters indicate, if extrapolated to other settings, that worker
labor supply is much less elastic than previously believed. Equation (4) then implies that employment and
wages will both be below the levels predicted for a hypothetical perfectly competitive labor market. Alterna-
tively, ﬁrms could be competing for the Type III, wage-sensitive workers.
I have not estimated parameters in the utility function governing the decision of where to work when a
worker enters the labor market. As each brand new worker must move out of his parent’s house, his college
dormitory, or his military barracks anyway, it is likely that a new worker’s labor supply elasticity is signiﬁcantly
higher than an older worker’s, as the older worker has already developed comfortable workplace and living
arrangements. Therefore, if workers are forward-looking dynamic agents, as in the model in Appendix A,
ﬁrms will compete strongly for brand new workers by offering fair terms at all age levels. It is less clear that
spot markets for experienced labor will always perfectly adjust to unforeseen shocks, as workers are, at least to
a small degree, locked-in to their current employers because of high switching costs.
9.3 Wage Policies and Worker Turnover
An interesting question is whether ﬁrms have the unilateral ability to signiﬁcantly reduce worker turnover by
making age–wage proﬁles more lucrative (Parsons, 1972; Pencavel, 1972; Stiglitz, 1974; Salop and Salop,
1976). Setting aside the statistically imprecise results for Type II workers, it appears that only the 29% of
Swedish engineers that are Type III workers are responsive to outside wage pressure. Unilateral increases in
wages can thus reduce worker turnover. Looking at Table 7, Type III workers are the majority of workers who
do leave, so in this case the group most likely to switch is also the group most sensitive to wages. I should
emphasize that this is a result of my empirical investigation, not an implication of my theoretical assumptions.
This is not an equilibrium analysis. If all ﬁrms offer higher wages in order to reduce the turnover of Type
III workers, then in equilibrium no ﬁrm will gain an advantage from doing so. I conjecture one equilibrium
might involve ﬁrms with more to gain from reducing worker turnover offering higher wages or more lucrative
age–wage proﬁles.
9.4 Concave Age–Wage Proﬁles
Economists do not lack explanations for why wages increase with age and why age–wage proﬁles are concave.
Myempiricalresultsinthispapersuggestanotherexplanation. Figure6depictsastylizedrenditionofaconcave
age–wage proﬁle. The empirical results in Table 8 show that workers supply their labor more elastically when
they are young. Switching costs for older workers are large and their sensitivities of employer switching to
unilateral wage changes decrease.
Speciﬁc human capital and delayed compensation models often predict that increasing the length of a rela-
tionship will make the relationship more productive (Becker, 1962; Becker and Stigler, 1974; Lazear, 1979). If
longer relationships do lead to higher worker productivity, ﬁrms may put more emphasis on recruiting younger
workers, meaning that ﬁrms will demand labor less elastically for younger workers (Hu, 2003).
29Figure 6: Potential Explanation for Concave Age–Wage Proﬁles
Concave Age−Wage Profile
Firms less elastically demand labor
Workers less elastically supply labor











Workers more elastically supply labor
The results on the labor supply of older and younger workers, and my conjecture on the behavior of ﬁrms,
indicate that, relative to older workers, younger workers face ﬁrms with less market power in the labor market.
As traditional monopsony theory suggests that more rents should accrue to a factor that is supplied more
elastically, it is not surprising that wages increase faster for younger workers than for older workers.49
My explanation is compatible with other explanations for concave age–wage proﬁles, such as information
revelation, incentives, and human capital accumulation. The results in this paper indicate that relative market
power in the labor market may be part of the explanation.
9.5 Limitations of My Analysis
Thus far, I have analyzed my results as if the assumptions of my structural model hold. Nevertheless, my model
is only an approximation of reality, and my assumptions almost certainly do not hold. I do argue in Section 3
that the assumptions are closer to reality in the labor market for Swedish engineers than elsewhere.
My estimation procedure treats the observed employment allocation as data on the revealed preferences
of workers given the observed worker state variables, and therefore I make the assumptions that all employer
switching is voluntary and that a worker can choose any employer. Violations of these assumptions may drive
my results. It would be ideal to estimate an equilibrium, two-sided matching model (as I do in Fox (2009a),
for example), which would allow a ﬁrm to screen workers and hire only the most suited for a ﬁnite set of open
positions. Unfortunately, I know of no matching model that can replicate the rich patterns of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
stochastic processes for age-wage proﬁles that we see in the data. Thus, any tractable matching model will
have to abstract away some of the realities of how wages are set in the labor market for Swedish engineers.
A related equilibrium sorting model would be a search model. If it is costly to contact employers and solicit
job offers, workers may move to unattractive employers, even though they would prefer higher-paying ﬁrms if
they knew such ﬁrms existed. If the search frictions model is the true one, I may be interpreting the failure to
move to attractive employers as reﬂecting insensitivity to the wage level rather than search costs. I can only
49The rapid increases of wages for younger workers can also be explained if some ﬁrms choose to offer steeper wage increases in order
to reduce worker turnover for younger workers (Salop and Salop, 1976).
30argue against the search model in terms of my knowledge of the Swedish labor market for engineers during the
sample period. Table 2 shows that the mean engineer works at a plant with 1690 other white-collar workers
and 251 fellow elite engineers. These plants correspond to large Swedish multinationals that are fairly well-
known in the international business community. It seems to me that an engineer would know about the major
employers of engineers and be willing to contact each major ﬁrm when deciding to switch employers
Alternative interpretations for the empirical results are always possible. For example, I ﬁnd that Type I
workers have high switching costs and low sensitivities to wage offers. Perhaps instead Type I workers are bad
employees who cannot get outside offers of employment, and so never switch. I also ﬁnd that Type II workers
often switch ﬁrms, but the data cannot statistically distinguish whether this switching is in response to outside
wage offers. Perhaps, contrary to supposed Swedish practice, Type II workers are bad workers whom ﬁrms
repeatedly ﬁre. Conversely, the focus on voluntary behavior by workers could actually lead to higher estimates
of labor supply elasticities, if ﬁrms in reality involuntarily transfer workers to expanding establishments that
offer higher wages.
Similarargumentsapplytotheassumptionthatthewagestochasticprocesscanbeestimatedfromthewages
actually received by switchers and stayers, without correction. My functional form choices are motivated by
the notion of workers progressing in the stochastic age–wage process one ﬁrm and then considering whether
to switch to another ﬁrm’s wage policy. The model assumes that heterogeneous preferences and taste shocks
rather than unobserved wage offers explain different choices by observationally equivalent workers. If I assume
an economic framework emphasizing unobserved wage offers, such as the Roy model (Heckman and Honore,
1990), I may come to different conclusions.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, I argue that the institutional framework of the Swedish labor market for engineers provides an ex-
cellent situation in which to study voluntary employer switching by experienced white collar workers. Swedish
labor market institutions make ﬁring and layoffs less likely, and allow me to more comfortably interpret the
observed allocation of engineers as the revealed preferences of workers. I model Swedish employers as exist-
ing in characteristic space, where each employer is distinguished by its geographic location, parent company,
industry, ﬁrm size and age-wage proﬁle. I observe data on almost all large employers of engineers and hence
observe the outside option that may tempt workers to switch. I use the data to estimate the age-wage proﬁle of
each ﬁrm separately.
Using a dynamic programming, discrete choice model of employer choice, I estimate the utility function
parameters for three discrete types of workers. From Table 8, my estimates of the marginal retention effects
show only economically meaningful magnitudes for an estimated 29% of Swedish workers. In general, labor
markets with less employer differentiation have higher switching probabilities, and younger workers supply
their labor more elastically to individual ﬁrms than older workers do. Younger workers have lower switching
costs and longer remaining careers with which to enjoy the wage gains after a switch.
ThemajorityofexperiencedSwedishengineersareestimatedtohavehighswitchingcostsandareestimated
to not respond to outside wage offers. My estimates show that switching costs are a leading answer for why
only 14% of Swedish engineers switch employers over a ﬁve-year period. Because of these rigidities, the spot
market for experienced engineers probably does not always perfectly adjust to supply and demand shocks. Still,
all workers at some point are new workers who must pick a new ﬁrm. The combination of a high elasticity of
labor supply for brand new but forward-looking workers, and lower but nonzero labor supply elasticities for
31older workers, may prevent older workers from being exploited in the monopsonistic sense. The estimates do
show that a majority of workers will not voluntarily move in response to outside wage offers. Therefore, the
estimates suggest that layoffs (even if used infrequently in Sweden) may be needed to reallocate labor to more
productive ﬁrms.
Finally, some of the empirical results in the paper provide new facts that are not sensitive to the structural
model. In particular, Figure 4 relates turnover to wage policies of ﬁrms and Table 4 compares the wage of
switchers to predicted wages at the old and the new employers.
A The Full Employer Choice Model and Estimation Details
A.1 Current Period Utility Function
For a worker i of age t (before the retirement age T) and with overall state vector si;t (including i’s previous
employer ji;t 1), his current period utility function if he chooses employment at ﬁrm ji;t out of J total ﬁrms is
















which describes the relative importance of the employer characteristics that enter the current period utility
function. The estimable parameters in the vector b are similar to the coefﬁcients in a linear regression model.
As for the employer characteristics, E[wi;j;t j si;t; ji;t] is the predicted new wage at a ﬁrm; dist(ji;t 1; ji;t) is
the geographic distance between the new and old ﬁrm; the three ml(ji;t 1; ji;t) terms are equal to 1 if the
worker considers switching industries, corporate boundaries and establishments, respectively; and size(ji;t) is
the number of workers at the potential employer. These employer characteristics are all calculable from the
data. The term ei;j;t is a logit preference shock. I will now explain the employer characteristics in more detail.
For this study, the most important characteristic is the wage wi;j;t of worker i at employer j. The parameter
bw controls how sensitive employer switching is to wage differences across ﬁrms.50 Because the choice of
employer ji;t is discrete, it is really the value of bw relative to the other parameters and to the normalized
distribution of the taste shocks ei;j;t that is important for understanding the role of wages in switching in the
labor market.
Switching costs are an important part of utility. If I did not include switching costs, there would be little
explanation for why workers do not instantaneously arbitrage wage differences across ﬁrms. In this imple-
mentation, switching costs depend on the relative locations, in employer characteristic space, of the origin and
destination ﬁrms. First, the model includes a switching cost in geographic distance bg;tdist(ji;t 1; ji;t), which
is deﬁned as an estimated parameter times the log distance in kilometers between the capitals of the Swedish
counties in which the old, ji;t 1, and potential new, ji;t, ﬁrms are located.51 The terms fml(ji;t 1; ji;t)g
3
l=1 are
indicator variables that refer to employer changes that may cause a worker to incur non-geographic switching
costs. One term refers to a base switching cost, which a worker incurs even if he moves to a new employer
50I discuss below the reason for using the expected value of the wage instead of the actual wage.
51I deﬁne dist(ji;t 1; ji;t) to be 0 for ﬁrms in the same county.
32across the street. An additional switching cost is incurred if the worker switches between ﬁrms in different
industries. Finally, the data show that 21% of observed switches for Swedish engineers in the estimation sam-
ple are between establishments owned by the same legal corporation.52 The ﬁnal switching cost is incurred
if a worker transfers outside of the boundaries of his corporation. The speciﬁcation allows the switching cost
parameters to vary by worker age t because, empirically, employer switching decreases with age.
The term size(ji;t) in (5) is the log of the number of white collar workers (not only engineers) at employer
ji;t. I include employer size to proxy for the nonwage beneﬁts received by workers at ﬁrm ji;t.53 I have also
estimated a version of the model where size is not included; the implications for switching behavior are quite
similar.
The ﬁnal term in the current period utility function is a worker, age and employer-speciﬁc taste shock ei;j;t.
Empirically, the shock plus the coming heterogeneity in utility parameters allow the model to match the data,
where observationally equivalent workers make different choices. Economically, the relative importance of
the taste shock compared to other parameters represents the contribution of idiosyncratic life developments to
employer switching. If the patterns of turnover in the data are not driven by differences in wages and other
characteristics, it is likely that employer switching is caused by the idiosyncratic developments captured by
ei;j;t. Theempiricalmodelassumesthatei;j;t isi.i.d.54 andhasthelogitdistribution, whichgreatlysimpliﬁesthe
estimation of the dynamic programming problem that I will now outline (Rust, 1987).55 Random coefﬁcients
are one way of augmenting a logit model to ensure more realistic choice patterns (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,
1995). In this paper, preference heterogeneity, the equivalent of random coefﬁcients, will be estimated by
taking advantage of panel data. I describe preference heterogeneity below.
A.2 Dynamic Employer Choice
The econometric method ﬁnds the parameters of the current period utility function that make the employer
choices in the data the most likely of all outcomes possible in a discrete choice, dynamic programming model.
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where the retirement age T is 60 years, d is a discount factor between 0 and 1, and ei;t is the vector of employer-
speciﬁc taste shocks at age t.
Because this is a ﬁnite-horizon and discrete-time dynamic programming problem, I solve for the model’s
predicted probabilities of employer choice P(ji;t j si;t; b;qw) by backwards recursion. Let h(si;t+1 j si;t; ji;t; qw)
be the transition density of the state variable si;t conditional on the worker’s choice of employer ji;t. The
52It is important to distinguish between establishments owned by the same legal corporation in order to preserve the geographic nature
of an employment choice.
53In a previous investigation, I estimated a simple version of the model with employer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for nonwage
amenities, as suggested by the literature in industrial organization (Berry, 1994). I then regressed the estimated ﬁxed effects on other
employer characteristics, and found that the only statistically signiﬁcant characteristic is employer size. In the model presented here, it is
computationally infeasible to include employer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, so the model includes employer size as a proxy for the total nonwage
beneﬁts at an employer.
54If ei;j;t is autocorrelated across a career for the same employer (an assumption that complicates computation), the model is a statistical
matching model where the match quality reﬂects the worker’s idiosyncratic evaluation of the employer’s workplace environment. This
contrasts to other models of statistical matching, where career-employer shocks primarily affect worker productivities and therefore wages
(Jovanovic, 1979).
55The independence from irrelevant alternatives property of the static logit model does not exist in dynamic models, because the choice-
speciﬁc value functions, v(si;t; ji;t), are discounted and weighted (by the probabilities of future employer choices) sums of the characteris-
tics of all employers.
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where g is the joint density of the worker’s vector of taste shocks ei;t, and where v(si;t; ji;t) is a choice-speciﬁc
value function.56 If the worker-speciﬁc shock has the logit distribution, then the probability of picking ﬁrm ji;t
for an age t worker is











This formula features the relevant choice’s present discounted value of payoffs in the numerator, normalized
by the sum of the payoffs of all choices in the denominator. Again, estimation proceeds by making the choice
probabilities in the data the most likely of all outcomes from the model.
A.3 Estimating Preference Heterogeneity
In a product market, ﬁrms compete by lowering prices to attract the marginal consumers who are indifferent
between keeping their current products or switching to new ones. In this application to the labor market,
I wish to determine the fraction of experienced engineers who would switch ﬁrms for small wage increases.
Estimatingpreferenceheterogeneityisthuscrucialtounderstandinghowlabormarketsforexperiencedworkers
operate. Worker heterogeneity could potentially enter the model both in the wage process and in the current
utility functions of workers. Because the wage process is a series of ﬂexible, one-period-ahead deviations as
a function of a worker’s lagged wage, there is already some heterogeneity in the stochastic process for wages.
Therefore, the model adds extra heterogeneity to the unknown parameters in a worker’s current period utility
function. In principle, each discrete worker type has unique preferences for wages, switching costs, nonwage
beneﬁts, and taste shocks. The workers who value wages more than other characteristics are more willing
to switch employers for small increases in outside wage offers. The model assumes that each ﬁrm does not
condition its stochastic process for age–wage proﬁles on worker type.
Because I use a nested dynamic programming approach to estimate the employer choice model, the com-
puter must solve one dynamic program for each worker type, at each set of trial parameters in the nonlinear
maximization routine. This computational burden forces me to use a small number K = 3 of worker types. I
estimate a separate vector bk of parameters of the current period utility function, (5), for each type k. I also
estimate a probability pk of each worker being each type, which corresponds to a discrete version of random
effects.57
A statistical observation for worker i of age t is a triplet (si;t; ji;t;si;t+1) of his state vector, si;t, his observed
employer choice, ji;t, and his new state vector after the choice, si;t+1. The ﬁnal pseudo-likelihood for both the
56In practice, to calculate V (si;t) I use the simpliﬁcation V (si;t) = å
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= 0:577 logP(ji;t j si;t; b;qw) by the properties of the extreme value (logit) distribution.
57The probability of being each type, pk, is independent of worker covariates because I restrict the sample to male, full-time Swedish
engineers working in the private sector. There are no extra individual-speciﬁc covariates to condition the type probabilities on.










P(ji;t;y j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)h(si;t+1;y j si;t;y; ji;t;y; qw;y); (7)
where I factor the joint density of the dependent variables ji;t;y and si;t+1;y into the unconditional choice proba-
bilitiesP(ji;t;y j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)andtheconditional-on-choicetransitiondensitiesofthestatevariableh(si;t+1;y j si;t;y; ji;t;y; qw;y).
Because h is not a function of bk or k, I can multiplicatively factor h out of the likelihood and estimate qw;y
consistently in a ﬁrst stage procedure. The ﬁrst stage is the wage regressions discussed in Section 5.58
The state vector, si;t;y, does not explicitly include changes in the overall labor market for Swedish engineers
over time. Because computing an equilibrium to a model of a ﬁrm’s entry, exit and age–wage proﬁle choices
in the labor market at every trial parameter value is difﬁcult, the model treats the industry equilibrium as ﬁxed
from a worker’s point of view during each ﬁve-year interval. The worker examines the outcomes of older
workers as evidence for what will happen to him when he ages, and he is unaware that current labor market
conditions will change.59 I index each sample interval (a ﬁve-year period in the data) by y, and I solve a separate
dynamic programming problem for each worker type k during each such y. Intuitively, identiﬁcation of each
bk comes from the actions of workers of different ages t within the same time interval y, while identiﬁcation of
each pk and the heterogeneity in the bk’s comes from looking at repeated observations of the same worker i in
different economic environments y and states si;t;y.60
The number of yearly observations for a given worker is Yi, out of a possible Y = 15 (1985-1971+1) such
observations. I call ˜ L a pseudo-likelihood because the model treats cross-sectional observations (different
y’s) as independent when constructing the likelihood. As an example, the interval 1971–1975, with the state
variable containing information from the 1970 data, is one y, while the interval 1972–1976, with 1971 state
information, is another. In other words, for 1971–1975, the state variable includes the worker’s employer in
1970 and the dependent variable in the model is the worker’s employer choice in 1975.
Because of entry and exit of ﬁrms and other labor market changes, two time intervals have unique economic
environments that cannot be directly related. The number and identity of employers, as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc
stochastic processes for age–wage proﬁles, may look different from one time interval to another, as Section 6
discusses. I do not adjust the likelihood (or the standard errors) to enforce the fact that switching ﬁrms in 1971
changes the state variable for the same worker’s choice in 1972–1976.61
58For dynamic programming, I discretize the wage into 20 bins based on the 5, 10, 15::: quantiles of the ﬁve-year-age-interval speciﬁc
wage distribution. I apply this discretization to the continuous wage processes estimated in the ﬁrst stage. The wage processes then move
an age 25–29 worker from a wage bin speciﬁc to age 25–29 to a wage bin speciﬁc to age 30–34.
59The assumption is workers believe that the experiences of older workers are good predictions of their own future outcomes. Even if
in reality differences between older and younger workers are driven by cohort and not age effects, the assumption is correct if workers
naively ignore cohort effects.
60Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) prove that agent payoffs are not nonparametrically identiﬁed in most inﬁnite-horizon
settings, and in ﬁnite-horizon dynamic programming problems where the current-period payoff vector is not restricted. In this employer
switching case, identiﬁcation comes from the ﬁnite-horizon nature of careers, and the fact that the same linear index in parameters appears
for all time periods. In the last period before retirement, a worker’s employer choice is completely static, and the agent’s payoffs are
semiparametrically (assuming a linear index and i.i.d. errors in payoffs, but not a parametric distribution for the error terms) identiﬁed,
as has been shown by Manski (1975) and Thompson (1989). The identiﬁcation of the linear index in earlier time periods requires both
the parametric assumption for tractable dynamic programming, and more importantly, the common set of parameters in the linear index in
order to ﬁx the intertemporal distribution of payoffs.
To my knowledge, no one has addressed the more complicated issue of identifying agent-speciﬁc preferences in a ﬁnite-horizon setting,
without using information on additional outcomes. Note that worker-speciﬁc preferences (ﬁxed effects) solve the initial conditions problem
(Heckman, 1981) of the current state variable being correlated with worker-speciﬁc preferences (because the preferences bi comprise an
estimated parameter vector), although they are computationally infeasible and data intensive.
61In addition, I do not adjust the standard errors from the employer choice problem to account for ﬁrst-stage estimation error in the
wage regressions. Calculation of exact standard errors is computationally burdensome, because it involves numerically computing many
ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect to the age- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage process parameters. In order to minimize the distortion in my
35The computationally burdensome part of the estimation routine is that, for each trial parameter vector
fbk;pkg
K
k=1, I must solve K Y = 315 = 45 ﬁnite horizon dynamic programming problems for the value
function, Vk(si;t), using backwards recursion. Each dynamic programming problem features decisions that are
made every time interval, for a total of ﬁve relevant ﬁve-year worker age intervals. The number of states far
exceeds the number of observations in any given year, y. Both the solution of each dynamic programming
problem and the outer maximization of the likelihood function suffer from separate curses of dimensionality.
Estimation of fbk;pkg
K
k=1 takes several days using a gradient-based optimization routine and a 2007-vintage
computer.62
A.4 Worker Tenure
In Section 5.3, I discussed how the model addresses tenure (the length of time a worker has held a particular
job) in wage regressions. Another well-known empirical fact is that the probability of a worker switching
employers declines with the worker’s tenure (Farber, 1999). In the employer choice model, a worker’s age t
is a state variable, but the number of years he has been employed at a particular employer is not. It would
be mathematically simple to use panel data to add worker tenure as an observed state variable to the model.
Unfortunately, using tenure will create many missing observations, corresponding to those workers who started
a spell of employment before the beginning of the sample. Dropping these workers will drop workers with
higher switching costs or lower sensitivities to outside wage offers, which will create biases in the distribution
of preferences that I estimate.
Therefore, the model lacks specially-introduced features to match facts about worker tenure. This is not
necessarily a major concern. The model will explain a worker with low tenure for his age as a worker with
low switching costs. Likewise, workers with especially high tenures for their ages have high switching costs.
Rather than any special, causal role of tenure in employer switching, heterogeneity in worker preferences can
match the usual empirical regularity that switching rates decline with worker tenure. As tenure increases, the
fraction of workers with high switching costs increases, as the low-switching-cost workers have already left.
A.5 Likelihood of the Model Using Data on Only the Separation Decision
Let di;t;y = 1 if the worker leaves his previous employer during a ﬁve-year interval y and let di;t;y = 0 if the











P(di;t;y j si;t;y; bk;qw;y);
whereP(di;t;y j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)=P(ji;t;y 1 j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)ifdi;t;y =1andP(di;t;y j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)=1 P(ji;t;y 1 j si;t;y; bk;qw;y)
if di;t;y = 0.
reported second-stage standard errors, I choose functional forms to maintain a decent level of precision in the ﬁrst-stage wage regressions.
62The outer optimization routine is NPSOL. I ﬁrst estimate versions of the model with fewer parameters, and then use these preliminary
estimates to choose starting values for the full model. I also use other choices for starting values for the full model. There are multiple local
maxima to the full model’s likelihood; the estimates reported in the paper correspond to the highest found valid local maximum. Because
I solve the ﬁnite-horizon dynamic programming problem using backwards recursion, there is no value function iteration and hence no
numerical error from terminating value function iteration too early.
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